EARL TRAVIS CAMPBELL, PETITIONER,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

ROTHENBERG, J.

The present habeas corpus petition is Earl Travis Campbell’s (“the defendant”) eleventh postconviction effort to overturn his December 2000 conviction and subsequent sentence for second degree murder with a firearm.1 In addition to the fact that this is the defendant’s eleventh effort, the claim the defendant raises in his current petition is wholly without merit. Although the defendant claims that manifest injustice has occurred due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable and excusable homicide when instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, the record, reflects that the trial court properly instructed the jury on justifiable and excusable homicide and then again expressly referenced the justifiable and excusable homicide instructions when instructing the jury on manslaughter. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:

JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE

F.S. 782.02

The killing of a human being is justifiable and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon the defendant, or to commit a felony in any dwelling house in which the defendant was at the time of the killing.

EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE

F.S. 782.03

The killing of a human being is excusable, and therefore lawful, under any one of the following three circumstances:

1. When the killing is committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with ordinary caution and without unlawful intent, or

2. When the killing occurs by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or

3. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune resulting from sudden combat, if a dangerous weapon is not used and the killing is *994not done in a cruel or unusual manner.

Then later, when instructing the jury on manslaughter, the trial court specifically referenced the justifiable and excusable homicide instructions it had previously read to the jury: “[T]he defendant cannot be guilty of Manslaughter if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have previously defined those terms.” Thus, the jury was properly instructed, and the defendant’s claim in this petition is frivolous.

Based on the defendant’s numerous, successive, and meritless postconviction filings, on March 19, 2014, this Court ordered the defendant to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing further pro se pleadings in this Court concerning his conviction and sentence in case number 00-26687. After carefully considering the defendant’s response to this Court’s show cause order, see State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla.1999) (explaining that courts should give pro se litigants notice and an opportunity to respond before preventing them from making further filings), we have decided to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and thus, we discharge the show cause order. We do so, however, with a strong reminder to the defendant that there comes a point in postconviction proceedings where “enough is enough.” Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

Although we recognize the defendant’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his conviction(s) and sentence, see Hepburn v. State, 934 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Johnson v. State, 915 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), there is no constitutional right to file a frivolous lawsuit. See Hepburn, 934 So.2d at 517-18; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (“Depriving someone of a frivolous claim ... deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps punishment of ... sanctions.”).

Petition denied; order to show cause discharged.