DAVID HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1958-11-20
No. A-156
STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
107 So. 2d 402 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1958) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases
Topics
Finality Of Litigation Good Cause For Extension Extension Of Time Good Cause

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

On Application for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

Florida Appellate Rule 3.14, subd. a, 31 F.S.A., provides:

“a. Time For. Unless further time is allowed, rehearings must be applied for by petition in writing within IS days after the filing of the decision or order of the Court.”

The decision herein was filed November 20, 1958, and no extension of time was applied for or allowed under the rule. Appellant filed a petition for rehearing on December 10, 1958, which is four days after the expiration of the 15-day period, and ap-pellee has moved to dismiss same on the ground that it was not filed within the time prescribed by the rule. We treat that motion as a motion to strike the petition.

There must be a conclusion to all litigation. The cited rule was designed to produce that result and is to be strictly construed with that purpose in mind. Only upon a timely showing of good cause will the period allowed for filing an application for rehearing be extended.

The decision in this cause therefore became final prior to the filing of the application for rehearing and appellant has neither shown nor attempted to show any cause whatever for failure to file the application within the 15-day period prescribed by the rule. The motion to strike the application for rehearing is well founded and an order will be entered accordingly.

STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

Other
PER CURIAM.

On Application for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

Florida Appellate Rule 3.14, subd. a, 31 F.S.A., provides:

“a. Time For. Unless further time is allowed, rehearings must be applied for by petition in writing within IS days after the filing of the decision or order of the Court.”

The decision herein was filed November 20, 1958, and no extension of time was applied for or allowed under the rule. Appellant filed a petition for rehearing on December 10, 1958, which is four days after the expiration of the 15-day period, and appellee has moved to dismiss same on the ground that it was not filed within the time prescribed by the rule. We treat that motion as a motion to strike the petition.

There must be a conclusion to all litigation. The cited rule was designed to produce that result and is to be strictly construed with that purpose in mind. Only upon a timely showing of good cause will the period allowed for filing an application for rehearing be extended.

The decision in this cause therefore became final prior to the filing of the application for rehearing and appellant has neither shown nor attempted to show any cause whatever for failure to file the application within the 15-day period prescribed by the rule. The motion to strike the application for rehearing is well founded and an order will be entered accordingly.

STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Am. Motorcycle Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 380 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
    …on. The cited rule was designed to produce that result and is to be strictly construed with that purpose in mind. Only upon a timely showing of good cause will the period allowed for filing the application for rehearing be extended. Harris v. State, 107 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). We decline to consider the untimely amended motion for rehearing. We grant the timely motion for rehearing and for clarification by substituting the following last full paragraph for that in our origional opinion: Accordingly,…
  • Thompson v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
    …other time set by the court.” The 15 day time limit is not jurisdictional. Chapman v. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church, 138 So. 630 (Fla.1932); Maffea v. Moe, 483 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (and cases cited therein); and Harris v. State, 107 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). The problem confronting us, however, is that after the issuance of our mandate on June 23, 1995, our term of court ended on July 10, 1995. § 35.10, Fla.Stat. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Judges of District Court…
  • In re Est. of Earl B. Rogers, 205 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
    …the merits to appellant’s counsel by mail did not extend- the time for appellant to apply for rehearing by three days under the terms of F.A.R. 3.4 (b) (3). Cf. In re Walker’s Trust, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So. 2d 363, and Harris v. State, Fla.App.1958, 107 So. 2d 402. WALDEN, C. J., and ANDREWS and CROSS, JJ., concur.…

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