JOSEPH STEWART, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph Stewart appeals the denial of his post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded two grounds of the motion for an evidentiary hearing, finding that the trial record did not contain sufficient evidence to refute Stewart's claims that his counsel was deficient in advising him to reject a favorable plea offer and in effectively conceding key elements of DUI manslaughter at trial.
The court reversed and remanded grounds one and three of the post-conviction motion for an evidentiary hearing because the trial court record did not contain documents refuting Stewart's claims of counsel deficiency or demonstrating lack of prejudice. The court found sufficient allegations that counsel conceded critical elements of the offenses, particularly by introducing speed evidence through the defense expert that effectively admitted the 'cause or contribute' element.
[1] Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on advice to reject a plea offer require a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice.
[2] A defendant may establish ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrating that counsel conceded all elements of a charged offense without a reasonable defense strategy…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute does not say that the operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal accident.... [Rather] any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver ... to which the fatal accident can be attributed will suffice.”
Establishes the legal standard that a defendant need not be the sole cause of a fatal accident in DUI manslaughter, only a contributing cause, making counsel's concession of causation particularly problematic.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 2010, Stewart was convicted by jury of DUI manslaughter, two counts of DUI with bodily injury, and leaving the scene of an accident with property d…
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The appellant appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand the denial of grounds one and three of the motion. We otherwise affirm the order on appeal.
In 2010, following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of DUI manslaughter, two counts of DUI with bodily injury and leaving the scene of an accident with property damage, and was sentenced to a total of 25 years’ imprisonment. He filed a postconviction motion alleging three grounds for relief. In ground one, the appellant asserted that counsel was ineffective for advising him to reject a favorable plea offer of 12-14 years’ imprisonment when counsel did not have a reasonable defense planned. In ground three, the appellant asserted the related claim that counsel was ineffective for conceding all the elements of the DUI manslaughter and DUI with bodily injury. Cf. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 7.8 (the elements of DUI manslaughter are: (1) the defendant drove, (2) while intoxicated (more than .08 BAC), and (3) “as a result of operating the vehicle, (defendant) caused or contributed to the cause of the death of [the victim].”) (emphasis added).
The appellant argued that counsel conceded each element of DUI manslaughter and DUI with bodily injury, with the exception of the appellant causing or contributing to the accident. But even there, he argues that it was unreasonable to go to trial contesting that element while knowing that the defense expert would testify the appellant was traveling 65-70 miles per hour (25 mph more than the speed limit). In effect, his counsel conceded the “cause or contribute” element of the offense by introducing the speed evidence through the expert (which the expert later conceded on cross examination to have “contributed to the crash”). See Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564, 567 (Fla.1989) (“[T]he statute does not say that the operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal accident.... [Rather] any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver ... to which the fatal accident can be attributed will suffice.”) (emphasis added); Robitaille v. State, 942 So.2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (concluding that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony in a DUI manslaughter case because other evidence showed that the defendant was under the influence, “was driving too fast,” and was “racing up the street.”). The State then highlighted the defense expert’s concession in its closing argument.
The record does not contain any documents refuting the appellant’s claim that counsel was deficient, or demonstrating that the appellant was not prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on grounds one and three of the appellant’s motion.
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part, with instructions.
LEWIS, C.J., THOMAS, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1989)
- Alston v. City OF Riviera Beach, 942 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Robitaille v. State, 942 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)