JOSEPH W. ATKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a conviction where the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's request for self-representation based on incompetence to represent himself, rather than the correct standard of competence to waive the right to counsel.
A trial court must determine whether a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel, not whether he is competent to represent himself, when evaluating a request for self-representation.
[1] A defendant's request for self-representation must be evaluated under the standard of competence to waive the right to counsel, not competence to conduct self-representation, pursuant to Faretta v. …
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Distinguishing between competence to represent oneself versus competence to waive counsel rights
Appellant repeatedly sought to discharge his defense counsel, whom he found unacceptable, after being informed he was not entitled to substitute couns…
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Appfellant seeks a new trial, claiming the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his request for self-representation upon finding appellant was not competent to represent himself. We agree. The record shows appellant presumptively made an unequivocal request for self-representation by repeatedly seeking to discharge defense counsel, whom he found unacceptable, after being informed that he was not entitled to substitute counsel. See Pasha v. State, 39 So.3d 1259, 1262 (Fla.2010). After conducting the necessary inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the trial court could not deny appellant’s request by finding appellant was not competent to represent himself. State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248 (Fla.1997). Rather, the court had to determine whether appellant was competent to waive the right to counsel. Weaver v. State, 894 So.2d 178, 193 (Fla.2004). *32Based on the court’s Faretta inquiry, there was no basis to conclude appellant was not competent to waive his right to counsel. See Laidler v. State, 69 So.3d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Id. 1009-10. In light of this disposition, we do not reach appellant’s remaining claim on appeal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
CLARK, ROWE, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997)
- Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2004)
- Khalid Ali Pasha v. State, 39 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 2010)
- Euriell Laidler v. State, 69 So. 3d 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)