DEBORAH PHILLIPS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,

v.

ANGELO GARCIA, ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS, ET AL.

SCALES, J.

The defendant below, Deborah Phillips, appeals an order denying her motion for fees made pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009).1 The plaintiff below, Angelo Garcia, and his counsel, Robert Pelier, cross-appeal from the same order with regard to the denial of their motion for attorney fees pursuant to section 57.105. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion, we affirm.

I. Background

On April 20, 2006, Garcia, represented by Pelier, commenced a civil action against Miami-Dade County, seeking damages on claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution. Garcia alleged that a number of Miami-Dade police officers caused Garcia to be wrongfully criminally charged as the result of the filing of a false police report.2 Garcia’s second amended complaint, filed on January 16, 2007, added Phillips, a Miami-Dade police officer involved in the arrest and investigation of Phillips, as a defendant.3

In March 2007, Phillips served Garcia and Pelier with a document captioned, “Request for Dismissal of Action Pursuant to F.S. § 57.105(4)” (Request for Dismissal). In the Request for Dismissal, Phillips demanded that the lawsuit against her be dismissed. Phillips asserted that the lawsuit was frivolous because there was no material evidence to support the claim of malicious prosecution. The Request for Dismissal was filed with the trial court on February 5, 2009.4

*571Prior to Phillips filing her 57.105 motion with the court, Phillips moved for summary judgment in June 2008, arguing there was no proof of any of the elements for a malicious prosecution claim. Additionally, Phillips argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity.

On January 12, 2009, the trial court heard, and subsequently granted, Phillips’s motion for summary judgment, holding Phillips was entitled to qualified immunity from Garcia’s lawsuit.

On January 6, 2012, Garcia and Pelier filed their motion for section 57.105 sanctions, which had previously been served upon Phillips and her counsel in August 2011. In their motion, Garcia and Pelier argued that Phillips’s pursuit of her section 57.105 fees motion was frivolous and, therefore, that they were entitled to fees under the statute.

After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying both section 57.105 motions. This timely appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

The appellate court reviews orders denying motions for attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Kisinger Campo & Assocs. Corp., 661 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). “The [trial] court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.” Asinmaz v. Semrau, 42 So.3d 955, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Vandergriff, 865 So.2d 520, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).

We recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge, and will reverse only if the record reflects that no reasonable trial judge could have denied the subject motions for 57.105 sanctions. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980).

III. Analysis

The fact that the trial court determined, via summary judgment, that Phillips was entitled to qualified immunity, does not necessarily mean that Garcia’s malicious prosecution claim lacked factual support — and was therefore sanctionable— under section 57.105. See Freeman v. Valdez, 393 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (affirming denial of a motion for section 57.105 fees where case was dismissed on basis that sheriff was immune from defamation claims); see also Bowen v. Brewer, 936 So.2d 757, 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“Winning a motion for summary judgment does not conclusively prove a section 57.105 claim. If that were the standard, then every award of summary judgment would be followed by a section 57.105 motion.”) (citation omitted).

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Phillips did not establish that Garcia’s malicious prosecution claim was meritless; Phillips simply proved that, in this instance, she was able to avoid Garcia’s claim by successfully advancing her immunity defense. See Cullen v. Marsh, 34 So.3d 235, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA *5722010) (“While [the defendant] ultimately established entitlement to an exemption so as to have [the writ of garnishment] dissolved, the fact that he prevailed on the merits entitles him to no sanction award .... Simply put, [the defendant] did not establish that [the plaintiffs] ‘claim[s]’ had no merit; rather, he proved that in this instance he was entitled to avoid them.”) (citations omitted). Thus we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips’s motion for section 57.105 fees.5

Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Garcia and Pelier’s motion for section 57.105 attorney fees without further discussion.

Affirmed.