RONALD EUGENE TYNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2014-10-08
No. 2D13-732
NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
148 So. 3d 519 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2014) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Ronald Eugene Tyner appealed his sentence imposed for violating his probation, arguing the trial court erred by sentencing him under the criminal punishment code rather than the original guidelines scoresheet from 1989. The appellate court agreed and reversed, holding that probation violators must be sentenced using the original scoresheet in effect when probation was imposed, not current sentencing guidelines.


Holding

The trial court erred in applying the criminal punishment code to Tyner's probation violation. When a defendant is resentenced for violating probation, the original scoresheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation must be used, not current sentencing guidelines.


Headnotes

[1] Following revocation of probation, a trial court must use the original scoresheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation.

[2] The criminal punishment code applies only to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The law is well-settled that following revocation of probation the trial court must use the original score-sheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation.”

Establishes the controlling legal principle that probation violators must be resentenced using the original scoresheet from when probation was imposed

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Tyner received a no-contest plea to burglary in 1985 for a 1979 offense and was initially sentenced to life imprisonment. After two reversals and rema…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
KHOUZAM, Judge.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Ronald Eugene Tyner appeals the sentence imposed after he admitted to violating his probation. The State properly concedes error, and we reverse and remand for resentencing.

In 1985, Tyner entered a no contest plea to burglary of a structure committed in 1979, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. After this court twice reversed and remanded for resentencing,1 *520the trial court resentenced Tyner in 1989 to twelve years’ imprisonment followed by life probation upon his election to be sentenced under the guidelines.2 In 2018, Tyner admitted to violating his probation by committing several offenses in Indiana, and the trial court sentenced him under the criminal punishment code to 480 months’ imprisonment.

In this appeal, Tyner argues and the State agrees that the trial court erred in sentencing him under the criminal punishment code because “[t]he law is well-settled that following revocation of probation the trial court must use the original score-sheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation.” Adekunle v. State, 916 So.2d 950, 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), receded, from on other grounds, Moses v. State, 13 So.3d 490, 491-92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); see Yourn v. State, 652 So.2d 1228, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“Yourn was sentenced on the grand theft charge in 1989, therefore, the 1989 scoresheet was the appropriate one for the court to use when sentencing him for violation of probation on that charge.”). The trial court’s order denying Tyner’s motion to correct sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) indicates that the court mistakenly believed that because Tyner’s violation of probation was based on the commission of new offenses, he was correctly sentenced under the criminal punishment code. But, as the State notes, Tyner was not sentenced for new crimes in 2013; he was sentenced for violating his probation for the 1979 offense. The criminal punishment code only applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2013). Consequently, Tyner should have been sentenced using the scoresheet used to originally place him on probation in 1989.

Accordingly, we reverse Tyner’s sentence and remand for resentencing. As Tyner correctly notes, “the trial court may sentence [him] to any period of incarceration permitted by the original guidelines range, including a one-cell increase for violation of probation, with credit for time served.” Harris v. State, 771 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.

NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Delma McNally Blair v. State, 181 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …effect [*1252] at the time of the original offenses.. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.702(d)(20) (“Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be in accordance with the guidelines.”); Tyner v. State, 148 So. 3d 519, 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding the trial court erred in sentencing Tyner under the criminal punishment code, after he admitted to violating his probation, rather than on the basis of the guidelines scoresheet in use at the time he was placed on pr…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw