JAMES L. HARPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harper was released from jail under a substantial assistance agreement to help law enforcement, but the agreement was vague about the duration of his obligation. After his efforts were terminated after only 16-17 days, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, and the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of his motion, finding the agreement lacked a meeting of the minds.
The court reversed the trial court's denial of Harper's motion to withdraw his plea, finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to the length of time he had to perform under the substantial assistance agreement, and the nature, scope, and duration of the agreement were vague both in explanation and implementation.
[1] A defendant may be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if there was no meeting of the minds regarding the terms of a substantial assistance agreement.
[2] A trial court should grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant's understanding of the duration of a substantial assistance agreement is contradicted by…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There was no meeting of the minds as to the length of time appellant had to perform under a substantial assistance agreement and his efforts were shut down by the supervising detective after only 16 or 17 days.”
Establishes the core holding that the lack of agreement on duration of cooperation was grounds to reverse the denial of the plea withdrawal motion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarper entered into a plea agreement with a substantial assistance component, which resulted in his pre-sentencing release from jail by October 26, 20…
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We reverse the denial of appellant’s motion, filed before sentencing, to withdraw his pleas pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f). There was no meeting of the minds as to the length of time appellant had to perform under a substantial assistance agreement and his efforts were shut down by the supervising detective after only 16 or 17 days. See Arzola v. State, 994 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Timothee v. State, 721 So.2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Pate v. State, 547 So.2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Elias v. State, 531 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Soto v. State, 515 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). No direct evidence contradicted appellant’s claim that he did not understand that his efforts at substantial assistance were subject to such a short time frame. The plea conference was abbreviated and perfunctory. The October 26, 2012 order provides that appellant’s release from jail prior to sentencing was “solely for the purpose of assisting law enforcement.” Although the order was silent as to the length of time that appellant had to perform .and the agreement gave the supervising detective the “sole discretion” to take appellant into custody “when the defendant is no longer needed in ongoing investigations,” appellant testified that he believed he had until January 28, 2013, when his sentencing was set, in which to “produce something,” presumably a drug transaction.
Under the circumstances, the trial court’s decision is reversed. The nature, scope and duration of the substantial assistance agreement were vague, both when initially explained to appellant and with respect to its implementation. On re*737mand, appellant shall be given leave to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
GROSS, MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Elias v. State, 531 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Timothee v. State, 721 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Arzola v. State, 994 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
- Williams v. State, 547 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Pate v. State, 547 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Soto v. State, 515 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)