DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, PETITIONER,
v.
HERBERT CLAY, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court's decision to reinstate a motorist's suspended driver's license, holding that when a circuit court finds a due process violation in an administrative license suspension proceeding, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the administrative hearing officer for a new hearing, not to reinstate the license directly.
When a circuit court quashes an order issued by a hearing officer on due process grounds, the matter must be remanded to the administrative agency for further proceedings, not resolved directly by the circuit court. The circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering license reinstatement rather than remanding for a new hearing.
[1] When a circuit court quashes an administrative order on due process grounds, the matter must be remanded to the administrative agency for further proceedings.
[2] A circuit court departs from the essential requirements of law by ordering reinstatement of a driver's license rather than remanding the case for further administrative p…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This court has consistently held that when a circuit court quashes an order issued by a hearing officer on due process grounds, the matter is to be remanded to the administrative agency for further proceedings.”
Establishes the binding legal standard that remand, not direct reinstatement, is the proper remedy for due process violations in administrative hearings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHerbert Clay's driver's license was suspended by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles following an administrative hearing. The circuit …
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Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”), seeks second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court order granting Herbert Clay’s (“Clay”) first-tier petition for writ of cer-tiorari.1 The circuit court quashed DHSMV’s administrative order affirming the suspension of Clay’s driver’s license, concluding that the suspension violated the motorist’s due process rights. In so ruling, the circuit court declined to remand *1260the case to the hearing officer for further proceedings, deeming the remand futile and burdensome. DHSMV argues that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it ordered the department to reinstate Clay’s license rather than remand the matter to the hearing officer for further proceedings.2 We agree and grant the petition.
This court has consistently held that when a circuit court quashes an order issued by a hearing officer on due process grounds, the matter is to be remanded to the administrative agency for further proceedings. See, e.g., Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Futch, 142 So.3d 910, 915-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (concluding that the circuit court misapplied the law when it directed the Department to set aside the suspension and reinstate the motorist’s driver’s license rather than remand the matter for further proceedings); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corcoran, 133 So.3d 616, 623 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (granting the Department’s petition for certiorari and explaining that remand for a new hearing is required when a subpoenaed breath test operator’s failure to appear is found to have caused a due process violation); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Icaza, 37 So.3d 309, 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“We conclude that the circuit court applied the wrong law when it refused to remand the case to the hearing officer.”); Tynan v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 909 So.2d 991, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[H]aving failed to accord Tynan due process in the first hearing, the Department had the right to conduct a hearing which met due process requirements.”); Lillyman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 645 So.2d 113, 114 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“When an evi-dentiary error is made in an administrative hearing, the remedy is to remand for further proceedings.”). Because binding precedent provides an opportunity to cure a due process violation, we conclude that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it failed to remand the case for a new hearing.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order of the circuit court.
PETITION GRANTED.
ORFINGER and BERGER, JJ., concur.
COHEN, J., concurring specially, with opinion.
concurring specially.
I agree that our precedent provides an opportunity to cure a due process violation in this context. I write separately to express concern about an apparent fundamental unfairness in these administrative proceedings. The transcripts reflect that at least some hearing officers exhibit a palpable predisposition. This is improper. Whether a proceeding is administrative or judicial, the parties are entitled to an impartial arbiter, and the record in this case — and in many that we see on appeal — does not reflect that. A neutral arbiter is the linchpin of due process and the foundation upon which the system of justice is built.
*1261For years, we have instructed hearing officers that citizens are entitled to subpoena and present witnesses at hearings. See Klinker v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 118 So.3d 835, 839 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Auster, 52 So.3d 802, 804-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Lee v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 4 So.3d 754, 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Pitts, 815 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). And yet, time after time, these decisions are ignored.
In the instant case, the circuit court recognized that remand would in all likelihood constitute a futile act. Not only is the officer involved no longer employed by the police agency, he now resides out of state. However, our precedent provides for the opportunity to correct the order entered in this case, which did not begin to comport with any semblance of due process.
COHEN, J.,
concurring specially.
I agree that our precedent provides an opportunity to cure a due process violation in this context. I write separately to express concern about an apparent fundamental unfairness in these administrative proceedings. The transcripts reflect that at least some hearing officers exhibit a palpable predisposition. This is improper. Whether a proceeding is administrative or judicial, the parties are entitled to an impartial arbiter, and the record in this case — and in many that we see on appeal — does not reflect that. A neutral arbiter is the linchpin of due process and the foundation upon which the system of justice is built. For years, we have instructed hearing officers that citizens are entitled to subpoena and present witnesses at hearings. See Klinker v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 118 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Auster, 52 So. 3d 802, 804-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Lee v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 4 So. 3d 754, 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Pitts, 815 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). And yet, time after time, these decisions are ignored.
In the instant case, the circuit court recognized that remand would in all likelihood constitute a futile act. Not only is the officer involved no longer employed by the police agency, he now resides out of state. However, our precedent provides for the opportunity to correct the order entered in this case, which did not begin to comport with any semblance of due process.
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Chakrin, 304 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…283 So. 3d at 1266 (citing Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hofer, 5 So. 3d 766, 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Clay, 152 So. 3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)). "It [likewise] is well-established that a circuit court's failure to apply the unambiguous language of a statute is a departure from the essential requirements of the law." Id. at 1268. Once either basis for such a dep…
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Elso v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 260 So. 3d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Chamizo, 753 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“Where the hearing officer makes a harmful trial error, the remedy is to send the matter back for a new hearing.”); see also Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Clay, 152 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“This court has consistently held that when a circuit court quashes an order issued by a hearing officer on due process grounds, the matter is to be remanded to the administrative agency for further proceedings.”). Finally,…
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State v. Jones (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…& Motor Vehicles v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (describing a circuit court's failure to follow a binding precedent as "a clear departure from the essential requirements of law"); Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Clay, 152 So. 3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that a circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it failed to follow binding precedent). Had it applied Byers, the circuit court could not have affirmed the county court on self-incrimi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Gulf OIL Realty Co. v. Windhover Ass'n, Inc., 403 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Pitts, 815 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- LEE v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 4 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Lillyman v. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 645 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Tynan v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 909 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Klinker v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 118 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Icaza, 37 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corcoran, 133 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Auster, 52 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)
- Bryon D. Park v. City OF W. Melbourne, 927 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)