NED CARMER THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal for witness tampering due to insufficient evidence.
Appellant was convicted of multiple counts, including witness tampering. The State conceded error on the witness tampering charge.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Perjury In An Official Proceeding cases and more on FLexlaw
The Appellant, Ned Carmer Thompson, appeals his judgment and sentence .for the following counts: (1) felony battery — domestic battery by strangulation; (2) false imprisonment; (3) tampering with a witness, victim, or informant; (4) felony battery — repeat offender; (5) tampering with a witness, victim, or informant; and (6) perjury in an official proceeding. He raises five issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. The Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible *997error when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present any evidence required for a conviction for witness tampering under count three. The State concedes error, and we agree.
Under Florida law, tampering with a witness, victim, or informant occurs when:
(1) A person who knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threatens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, or offers pecuniary benefit or gain to another person, with intent to cause or induce any person to:
(e) Hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of information relating to the commission or possible commission of an offense or a violation of a condition of probation, parole, or release pending a judicial proceeding....
§ 914.22(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013).
There is no evidence in the record establishing that the victim was attempting to contact law enforcement during the time of the incident. As such, there was insufficient evidence as to an essential element of the crime. See Longwell v. State, 123 So.3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Accordingly, the Appellant’s conviction for witness tampering under count three must be REVERSED.
THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Antoine E. McCloud v. State, 224 So. 3d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…t evidence showing that the witness was attempting to contact law enforcement during the commission or possible commission of the criminal offense. Mr. McCloud observes that the First District’s decision in McCray, which relied on Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), and Longwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), is squarely on point. In all three cases, the First District held that to support a conviction for witness tampering under section 922.14(l)(e), the State was required…
-
Antoine E. McCloud v. State, 260 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 2018)…orcement during the time of the incident to support a conviction under this statute." Id. There was no explanation for this interpretation; rather, the First District merely applied its earlier reading of the statute. Id. (citing Thompson v. State , 153 So. 3d 996, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ). The court reasoned that the victim's testimony that she was "trying to call somebody" when the defendant broke her phone was insufficient to establish that she was attempting to contact law enforcement. Id. Due to the lac…
-
Taffe v. State, 232 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…g under section 914.22(l)(e), the State is required' “to present evidence that the victim was attempting to contact law enforcement during the time of the-incident.” McCray v. State, 171 So. 3d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) and Longwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)). We reject this authority and instead adopt the Second District’s holding in McCloud v. State, 224 So. 3d 842, 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Certifying conflict with McCray,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Longwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)