ROBERT B. TALBOT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2015-03-12
No. 1D12-0921
WOLF, BENTON, and RAY, JJ., concur.
159 So. 3d 365 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

In this Anders appeal, Robert Talbot challenged his sentencing on multiple grounds, including improper imposition of probationary conditions and various fines and costs. The court affirmed the judgment and denial of the motion regarding probationary terms but reversed and remanded regarding the fines, costs, and surcharges due to lack of proper oral pronouncement and failure to inform the defendant of his right to dispute the indigent legal assistance lien.


Holding

The court affirmed the imposition of probationary conditions but reversed the $2,000 discretionary fine, the surcharges pursuant to sections 938.04 and 938.06, and the $100 indigent legal assistance lien because the trial court failed to delineate the fines and costs in its oral pronouncement and failed to inform the defendant of his right to a hearing regarding the lien.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must orally pronounce all conditions of probation at sentencing.

[2] A trial court must orally pronounce discretionary fines imposed pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court announced fines and costs as a lump sum, but the oral pronouncement did not delineate the specific costs and fines included in the amount”

Establishes the primary sentencing error requiring reversal of the discretionary fine and surcharges

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Facts & Procedural History

Talbot was sentenced and the trial court announced fines and costs as a lump sum without delineating the specific components. The sentence included tw…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this Anders appeal, the appellant filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), alleging that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing two special conditions 'of probation which were not orally pronounced at sentencing, (2) imposing a $2,000 fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes (2009), without an oral pronouncement, (3) imposing a $100 surcharge on the fine pursuant to section 938.04, (4) imposing a $20 surcharge on the fine pursuant to section 938.06, and (5) imposing a $100 indigent legal assistance lien pursuant to section 938.29, without informing him of his right to a hearing to dispute the amount of the lien. We affirm the appellant’s judgment and sentence, and the denial of the appellant’s rule 3.800(b) motion to the extent the appellant challenged the probationary terms. However, we remand for the trial court to correct the sentencing errors raised in his rule 3.800(b) motion relating to the imposition of fees and costs.

In this case, the trial court announced fines and costs as a lump sum, but the oral pronouncement did not delineate the specific costs and fines included in the amount. As a result, the imposition of the $2000 discretionary fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes (2009), and the surcharges imposed on that fine pursuant to sections 938.04 and 938.06,1 must be reversed. See Nix v. State, 84 So.3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Additionally, we reverse the $100 indigent legal assistance lien pursuant to section 938.29, because the appellant was not informed of his right to a hearing to dispute the amount of the lien. See Harrison v. State, 146 So.3d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). On remand, the trial court may either enter a corrected judgment striking the amounts, or it may reimpose those fines/costs after providing notice and following the proper procedure. See Nix, 84 So.3d at 426; see also Williams v. State, 82 So.3d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing judgment for fines, costs and surcharges “because the trial court failed to delineate the discretionary fine(s) when announcing at sentencing that it would impose $1,522.50 in costs and fines,” and stating that the assessments may be reimposed on remand after giving Appellant notice and following the proper procedure); Bradshaw v. State, 148 So.3d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[W]e reverse the *366$100 Appointed Counsel Attorney Fee. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the fee if it follows the correct procedure in doing so.”). In all other respects, the judgment and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

WOLF, BENTON, and RAY, JJ., concur.


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