GABLES INSURANCE RECOVERY, INC., PETITIONER,
v.
PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENT
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The court held that it would not grant second-tier certiorari review because the appellate division did not violate clearly established law or procedure, despite potential disagreement with the county court's ruling.
[1] Second-tier certiorari review is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law.
[2] Second-tier certiorari relief is not available for simple legal error or disagreement with an appellate division's interpretation of law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGIR sued Progressive for PIP benefits after an assignment from an insured. The county court ordered GIR to join the original medical provider, All X-R…
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Petitioner, Gables Insurance Recovery, Inc. (“GIR”), the plaintiff at the trial court level, seeks second-tier certiorari review of an order of the appellate division of the circuit court.
The appellate division dismissed GIR’s petition seeking first-tier certiorari review of an order of the county court. Specifically, the appellate division dismissed GIR’s petition, determining that GIR had not met a threshold jurisdictional hurdle for first-tier certiorari review, i.e., GIR did not demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm due to a putative error of the county court.
Because the appellate division’s order does not demonstrate sufficient cause for this Court to invoke its narrow second-tier certiorari review, we dismiss GIR’s petition.
I. Background Facts
GIR sued Respondent Progressive Express Insurance Company (“Progressive”) in Miami-Dade County Court seeking recovery of benefits allegedly payable pursuant to a PIP policy issued by Progressive to its insured, Delia Pena (“Pena”).
GIR alleges that Pena was involved in an automobile accident in July of 2010, and received treatment from All X-Ray Diagnostic Services (“All X-Ray”). GIR further alleges that Pena assigned her PIP benefits to All X-Ray which, in turn, assigned those benefits to GIR. GIR alleges that, despite Progressive’s actual knowledge of this assignment, Progressive refused to pay GIR.
In response, Progressive alleges that it paid the benefits to All X-Ray, thereby *865satisfying any obligation to pay PIP benefits under Pena’s policy.
Progressive filed a motion in the county court, alleging that All X-Ray was an indispensable party to the litigation between GIR and Progressive. In granting this motion, the county court required GIR to join All X-Ray as a co-defendant in its action against Progressive.
GIR filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of the county court’s interlocutory order. GIR argued that the county court departed from the essential requirements of law by compelling GIR to sue All X-Ray (rather than requiring Progressive to join All X-Ray as a third party defendant). In other words, GIR objected to being forced to sue a party (All X-Ray) against whom GIR asserted it had no claim.
The appellate division dismissed GIR’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the petition did not establish an irreparable harm that could not be remedied on plenary appeal. GIR then filed the instant petition with this Court seeking second-tier certiorari review of the appellate division’s order.
II. Analysis
In a second-tier certiorari review of an order of the appellate division of the circuit court, our inquiry is limited to “whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1092 (Fla.2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)). Second-tier certiorari relief is not available when we might be confronted by simple legal error or when we might disagree with the appellate. division’s interpretation of applicable law. Id. at 1094. We grant second-tier certiorari relief “only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1092 (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983)).
While we may disagree with the county court’s determination that All X-Ray is an indispensable party to the dispute between GIR and Progressive1, we see nothing in the record to indicate that the appellate division failed to afford GIR due process or that it applied the incorrect law.
Petition dismissed.
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hirtzel, 163 So. 3d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…9-71; Trimble, 821 So. 2d at 1086-87. The circuit court must analyze whether the evidence is substantial. Where the circuit court analyzes this question, its answer is of zero consequence. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 159 So. 3d 863, 864-865, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D96, 2014 WL 7444598, at *1-2 & n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 31, 2014) (specifically disagreeing with circuit court’s legal analysis, yet still dismissing second-tier certiorari petition because circuit court analyzed proper qu…
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Fla. Int'l Univ. v. Ramos, 335 So. 3d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)…003)). Certiorari relief, however, “is not available when we might be confronted by simple legal error or when we might disagree with the appellate division’s interpretation of applicable law.” Gables Ins. Recovery v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 159 So. 3d 863, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). Fundamental to due process is that the ultimate decision in any hearing be based upon evidence presented, which the accused has sufficient opportunity to refute. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). To fulfil…
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46 NW 17 CT LLC v. City of Miami (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…f a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice so as to permit our review by second-tier certiorari, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to grant relief. See Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 159 So. 3d 863, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[W]e see nothing in the record to indicate that the appellate division failed to afford GIR due process or that it applied the incorrect law. Petition dismissed.”); AbouElSeoud v. AIM Recovery Servs., Inc., 299 So. 3d 428,…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 2010)
- Fla. Dep't OF Revenue v. James (Willie) Cummings, 930 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2006)
- LET Miami Beach Decide v. City OF Miami Beach, 120 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)