JAMES BARNETT, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

EVANDER, J.

James Barnett was charged by amended information with: Count I — traveling for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2012);1 Counts II and III — using a computer service or device to solicit unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of section 847.1035(S)(a), Florida Statutes (2012);2 and Count IV — attempted lewd or lascivious battery. Counts I, III, and IV were alleged to have occurred on October 26, 2012, while Count II was alleged to have occurred on October 24, 2012. The jury' found Barnett guilty on all four counts. Thereafter, the trial court imposed sentence on Counts I, II, and IV. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, no sentence was imposed on Count III because of double jeopardy concerns. On appeal, Barnett raises only one issue. He contends that double jeopardy principles precluded him from being convicted on either solicitation count. We disagree.

*924The State’s evidence reflects that on October 24, 2012, Barnett corresponded bye-mails, instant messaging, and text messages with an individual he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl. In fact, Barnett was communicating with an Osceola County Sheriffs Department lieutenant, who was representing herself on an Internet dating website to be a young girl interested in an intimate encounter with an older man. During his communications, Barnett expressed his desire to engage in certain unlawful sexual acts with the fictitious fourteen-year-old- and discussed meeting for a sexual liaison on one of the following two nights. However, the next day Barnett appeared to change his mind, texting the fictitious fourteen-year-old, “I can’t risk going to jail and losing my son.” The fictitious fourteen-year-old responded with a text: “It’s okay. I get it. I won’t bother you then ....”

On the ensuing day (October 26, 2012), Barnett reinitiated electronic communications with the fictitious fourteen-year-old and once again expressed his desire to engage in unlawful sexual acts with her. A meeting was arranged for that evening. When Barnett arrived at the agreed-upon location, he was promptly arrested. Three condoms and some sexual performance enhancement pills were found inside his vehicle.

This court has previously stated, that if a defendant solicited an unlawful sexual act with a minor through a single use of a computer service or device prior to traveling to meet the minor for unlawful sexual conduct, double jeopardy principles would preclude a conviction under both section 847.0135(3) and section 847.0135(4). Pinder v. State, 128 So.3d 141, 143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).3 Support for this general principle can be found in subsequent cases authored by our sister courts, Hartley v. State, 129 So.3d 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) and Shelley v. State, 134 So.3d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 147 So.3d 527 (Fla.2014).

In Hartley, the defendant was convicted of three counts of using a computer to solicit a minor for unlawful sexual conduct and one count of traveling to meet a minor for unlawful sexual conduct. Each episode of solicitation was alleged to have taken place on a separate day, specifically November 2, 2011 (Count I), November 3, 2011 (Count II), and November 4, 2011 (Count III). Count IV charged the defendant with traveling to meet the minor on November 4, 2011. The Hartley court recognized that all of the elements necessary to establish the violation of section 847.0135(3)(a) are included within the elements necessary to establish a violation of section 847.0135(4)(a). 129 So.3d at 491. As a result, the court found that double jeopardy principles required it to vacate Hartley’s solicitation conviction on Count III. Id. However, Hartley’s convictions on Count I and Count II were affirmed based on the language in section 847.0135(3), expressly providing that each use of a computer service or device may be charged as a separate offense:

In the instant case, the legislature has authorized separate punishments for violations of section 847.0135(3) where there were separations of time between each of the crimes charged. Therefore, counts I and II are separate offenses *925which do not violate double jeopardy because there was a temporal break between the occurrences underlying each of them and the acts that served as the basis for counts III and IV.

Id. at 490-91 (citation omitted).

In Shelley, the defendant was charged with a single count of violating section 847.0135(3)(b) and one count of violating section 847.0135(4)(b). Both offenses were alleged to have occurred on the same day. In setting aside the solicitation conviction on double jeopardy grounds, the Shelley court similarly recognized that the elements of solicitation under section 847.0135(3)(b) were subsumed by the elements of traveling after solicitation under section 847.0135(4)(b). 134 So.3d at 1141. While recognizing that the Legislature had expressly authorized multiple punishments for violations of section 847.0135(3)(b), it rejected the State’s argument that the Legislature also intended to allow separate punishments for conduct that violates both section 847.0135(3)(b) and section 847.0135(4)(b). Id. at 1140.4 The Shelley court did acknowledge, however, that convictions for both soliciting and traveling could be legally imposed “in cases in which the State has charged and proven separate uses of computer devices to solicit.” Id. at 1142.

In the instant case, double jeopardy precluded a conviction on Count III (solicitation on October 26, 2012).5 However, double jeopardy principles do not require a vacating of Barnett’s conviction on Count II (solicitation on October 24, 2012). There was clearly a temporal break between Barnett’s illegal actions committed on October 24 and those committed two days later.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, C.J. and LAMBERT, J., concur.