CHIQUITA KIARA FLOYD, APPELLANT,

v.

STACY L. SMITH, JASON OWEN SMITH AND CONNER LYNN SMITH, APPELLEES

BILBREY, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s final judgment awarding costs and attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, on grounds that the pre-trial proposal for settlement1 by the defendants failed to strictly comply with the law and the rule, and was thus insufficient to support the award of costs and fees in the final judgment. Because the defense proposal for settlement did strictly comply with section 768.79 and rule 1.442, we affirm the final judgment on appeal.

Appellant brought her negligence action seeking monetary damages against the Appellees in connection with an automobile collision. On April 28, 2013, Appellees filed their notice of service of proposal for settlement with the court, but as required by rule the actual proposal was not filed at that time. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(d). The proposal was served on Appellant electronically, pursuant to rule 2.516, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The proposal was not accepted, and the case proceeded to jury trial.

The jury found no negligence by the defendants and awarded zero damages to Appellant/plaintiff. Final judgment for the defendants on the jury verdict was entered January 15, 2014. Thereafter, on February 6, 2014, the defendants filed their motion to tax costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442. In support of the motion, the defendants attached the notice of proposal for settlement and the proposal itself. After a hearing on the motion to tax costs and fees, the trial court rejected Appellant’s argument that the proposal failed to strictly comply with section 768.79 and rule 1.442 due to the proposal’s lack of a certificate of service. The court also rejected the female Appellant’s assertion that the proposal’s reference to “his claims” rendered the proposal ambiguous, and thus insufficient to support an award of costs and attorney’s fees under the law.

Appellant first argues, as she did at the trial level, that the proposal for settlement lacked a certificate of service and was thus insufficient to support a judgment under section 768.79. Appellant correctly asserts that both section 768.79 and rule 1.442 must be strictly, construed because they are in derogation of the common law regarding attorney’s fees. Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So.2d 223 (Fla.2007); see also Design Home Remodeling Corp. v. Santana, 146 So.3d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (failure to comply with time requirements for offers of settlement cannot be considered “mere technical violation”). However, the absence of a certificate of service is not actually, a violation of the current law and rules governing service and thus does not support reversal of the final judgment.2

*569Section 768.79 does not specify that a certificate of service is required, but merely requires the offer to “be served upon the party to whom it is made.” Appellant relies on rule 1.442(c)(2)(G), which requires a proposal for settlement to “include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2)(G). However, although the previous version of rule 1.442(c)(2)(G) required a proposal for settlement to “include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f),” there is no longer a rule 1.080(f).3 Rule 1.080 no longer requires a certificate of service in a particular form. Rule 1.080(a) now provides: “Every pleading, subsequent to the initial pleading, all orders, and every other document filed in the action must be served in conformity with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.” (eff. Sept. 12, 2012); In re Amendments to Fla. R. Jud. Admin., 102 So.3d 505 (Fla.2012).

Rule 2.516 changed the requirements for service of documents, most notably, requiring service by e-mail. The rule provides in detail the method by which e-mail addresses are to be determined and verified. The rule then sets out the requirements for the contents of the e-mail for service. For example, the subject line of the e-mail must begin “with the words ‘SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT’ in all capital letters,” the case number must be included, and the body of the e-mail must identify the court, case number, names of the parties, title of the document served, and the name and telephone number of the serving person. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.516(b)(l)(E)(i-ii). Nowhere in rule 2.516(b)(1)(E) is there a requirement that the e-mail or document served by the email contain a certificate of service.

Appellant does not challenge the e-mail service of the proposal for settlement or assert any violation of rule 2.516(b)(1)(E). Rather, she relies on Milton v. Reyes, 22 So.3d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), for her position that the lack of a certificate of service is fatal to the award of costs and fees under section 768.79 and the procedural rules governing proposals for settlement.

Milton was decided prior to the promulgation of rule 2.516 and the corresponding amendments to rules 1.080 and 1.442. Our de novo review4 of the award of costs and attorney’s fees due to Appellant/plaintiffis rejection of the proposal for settlement pursuant to section 768.79 and rules 1.080, 1.442, and 2.516, leads us to the same conclusion reached by the trial court. The proposal of settlement, the notice of serving such proposal, and the e-mails produced for the hearing on the motion to tax costs and fees strictly complied with the requirements for the award of costs and attorney’s fees.

We also reject Appellant’s claim that the typographical gender error in the proposal resulted in any ambiguity which could have affected Appellant’s consideration of the proposal. Appellant was the only party in the case besides the Appel-lees. There could have been no confusion *570when the proposal offered to settle ‘his' claims” when it should have said “her claims.” No one but the Appellant had asserted any claims. “It [rule 1.442] merely requires that the settlement proposal be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification.” State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So.2d 1067, 1079 (Fla.2006). See also Carey-All Transport, Inc. v. Newby, 989 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

The final judgment on appeal is AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.