GEORGE COURSON
v.
STATE
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George Courson, captain of a state convict camp, was convicted of manslaughter for the death of a convict during disciplinary punishment, while his co-defendant Soloman Higginbotham, a convict guard, was acquitted on the same evidence. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial, finding the verdicts irreconcilable and raising doubts about whether the jury fairly applied the evidence to Courson alone.
The court reversed Courson's conviction and remanded for a new trial on the charge of manslaughter, holding that when verdicts acquitting one defendant and convicting another appear irreconcilable with the prosecution's theory of the evidence, a new trial must be awarded to eliminate uncertainty about whether the jury fairly weighed the evidence against the convicted defendant.
“in view of the jury's acquittal of Higginbotham, the guard, whose guilt was as much, if not more demonstrated by the evidence upon which the prosecution relied for conviction, than is that of Courson, the captain, who was found guilty, the ends of justice will be best subserved by awarding Courson a new trial”
Establishes the core rationale: the acquittal of the co-defendant on the same evidence necessitates a new trial for Courson
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCourson and Higginbotham were jointly indicted for first-degree murder in Duval County. They were tried together on the same evidence regarding the de…
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George Courson and Soloman Higginbotham were jointly indicted in Duval County for murder *124in the first degree. A joint trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of manslaughter against Courson who was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in State prison. Higginbotham, tried at the same time on -the same evidence, was acquitted.
Courson was captain of a State convict camp. The State’s contention, under its evidence, was that a convict in Courson’s camp by the name of Arthur Maillefert, was killed through culpable negligence of Courson, the captain, and of Higginbotham, a convict guard, while inflicting disciplinary punishment on Maillefert in a punishment cell referred to as a “sweat box,” which was designed to be used for the close confinement of unruly convicts.
A careful study of the record has convinced a majority of the Supreme Court that, in view of the jury’s acquittal of Higginbotham, the guard, whose guilt was as much, if not more demonstrated by the evidence upon which the prosecution relied for conviction, than is that of Courson, the captain, who was found guilty, the ends of justice will be best subserved by awarding Courson a new trial, where his case can be reconsidered by another jury in the light of the charge made in the indictment as it will stand against Courson alone upon remand of the cause for further proceedings to be had in the criminal court of record on a charge of manslaughter.
Where a verdict in a criminal case acquitting one and convicting another appears to have been arrived at with reference to the convicted defendant, by considerations outside the evidence, as reflected in the verdict found which appears to be irreconcilable with the State’s theory of the evidence, a new trial should be awarded in order that the conviction of the one defendant may not be left shrouded in any uncertainty or doubt as to whether the accused has' been fairly *125'dealt with in the jury’s understanding and weighing of the evidence as to him, according to the rules by which evidence is required to be weighed. Hammock, et al., v. State, 99 Fla. 1119, 128 Sou. Rep. 267.
Reversed and remanded for appropriate proceedings for a new trial on a charge of manslaughter.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield and Terrell, J.J., concur.
Ellis and Buford, J. J., dissent.
. Brown, J., not participating because of illness.
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Citator
Cited By
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Makron H. Shepherd v. State, 108 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)…s so interfused with error that it must be reversed and a new trial granted. Reversed. STURGIS, C. J., and THORNAL, Associate Judge, concur. . F.S. §§ 916.03, 916.04 and 916.05, F.S.A. . 12 Am. Jur. § 5, p. 450. .Johnson v. State, 113 Fla. 193, 151 So. 383. . Coker v. State, 82 Ma. 5, 89 So. 222. . Coker v. State, supra note 4; Ford v. Ford, 150 Fla. 717, 8 So. 2d 495. . Courtney v. Central Trust Company, 112 Fla. 298, 150 So. 276. . F.S. § 916.01, F.S.A.…
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Parker v. State, 124 Fla. 780 (Fla. 1936)…not more, demonstrated by the evidence upon which the prosecution relied for conviction than was that for the de-n fendant, Earl Parker, and W. M. Pringle.” Plaintiff in error relies on what was said in the opinion in the case of Courson v. State, 113 Fla. 123, 151 Sou. 383, where this Court said: “A careful study of the record has convinced a majority of the Supreme Court that, in view of the jury’s acquittal of Higginbotham, the guard, whose guilt was as much, if not more demonstrated by the evidence u…
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Williams v. State, 127 Fla. 246 (Fla. 1936)…lose substantial evidence of a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed. It, therefore, app'ears that the ends of justice will be sub-served by reversing the judgment and remanding the cause for a new trial. See Courson v. State, 113 Fla. 123, 151 [*247] Sou. 542; Woodward, et al., v. State, 113 Fla. 301, 151 Sou. 509, and cases there cited. It is so ordered. Reversed. Ellis, P. J., and Terrell, J., concur. Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion annd judg…
Authorities Cited
- Hammock v. State, 99 Fla. 1119 (Fla. 1930)