M.N., JR., THE FATHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A biological father appeals an order dismissing his second motion to set aside an adoption judgment. The trial court denied the motion on res judicata grounds without addressing the father's notice-related claims, and the appellate court affirmed based on a statutory one-year limitation period for such motions.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the father's second motion, finding that while the trial court erred in applying res judicata (because the notice issue was not addressed in the first order), the motion was nonetheless barred by section 63.182(1), Florida Statutes, which sets a one-year statute of repose for vacating adoption judgments measured from the entry of the parental rights termination order.
[1] A second motion to set aside an adoption is not procedurally barred by res judicata if the prior order did not actually litigate and decide the issue raised in the second…
[2] An action to vacate, set aside, or nullify a judgment of adoption is barred if filed more than one year after the entry of the judgment terminating parental rights, pursu…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an action or proceeding of any kind to vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a judgment of adoption ... may not be filed more than 1 year after entry of the judgment terminating parental rights”
Establishes the statutory one-year limitation period (statute of repose) that bars the father's motion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA biological child was born during a marriage between the mother and legal father. The parental rights of both the mother and legal father were subseq…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statute Of Repose cases and more on FLexlaw
M.N., the Father, appeals the order dismissing his second motion to set aside a final judgment of adoption. We affirm.
The Father’s biological child was born to a marriage between the mother and the legal father. After the parental rights of the mother and the legal father were terminated, a relative adopted the child. The Father moved to set aside the adoption, claiming that notice required by statute was not provided to the Father. The trial court denied the motion without addressing the notice issue. Instead, the court found the Father did not have standing to contest the adoption because he was not the legal father.
After the Father’s appeal of the order was dismissed as untimely, the Father filed his second motion to set aside the adoption, again relying on the notice issue. The court accepted the state’s argument that the motion was procedurally barred based on the doctrine of res judicata, and the court denied the motion.
We find that the court erred in finding the second motion was procedurally barred, as the court did not address the notice issue in its first order. See State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.2d 1384, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (recognizing that the doctrine of res judicata is not invoked if an issue was not “actually litigated and decided”). However, without addressing the merits of the Father’s argument, we affirm.
Section 63.182(1), Florida Statutes (2013), a statute of repose,1 provides that “an action or proceeding of any kind to vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a judgment of adoption ... may not be filed more than 1 year after entry of the judgment terminating parental rights.” Because the Father’s second motion was filed in December 2013, more than one year after the termination order was entered, the statute bars his action to set aside the adoption.
Ajfirmed.
STEVENSON, TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
J.G. v. State, 247 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…Stat. (2015). Since J.G. did not file his appeal seeking to set aside the adoptions until 2018, more than one year after the termination order was entered, his appeal is barred and must be dismissed. See M.N., Jr. v. Dep't of Children and Families , 161 So. 3d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). J.G. also lacks standing to challenge the adoption proceedings. Because the Children were born into an intact marriage, the Children's legal father was their mother's husband "unless and until a court effect[uated] [a] su…
-
I. T. v. IN the Interest of: K. P. L. (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…not be filed more than 1 year after the entry of the judgment terminating parental rights." However, the trial court gave no indication that a judgment terminating parental rights had been entered in this case. Cf. M.N. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 161 So. 3d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (affirming denial of motion to set aside final judgment of adoption where order terminating father's parental rights had been entered more than one year prior to the filing of the motion). Neither did the court consider the…
-
J.G. v. Dep't of Child. & Families (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- State v. Bailey, 603 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1999)