BLOGWIRE HUNGARY SZELLEMI ALKOTST HASZNOST, KFT, A/K/A GAWKER MEDIA, APPELLANT,
v.
TERRY GENE BOLLEA, P/K/A HULK HOGAN; HEATHER CLEM; GAWKER MEDIA, LLC, A/K/A GAWKER MEDIA; NICK DENTON; A.J. DAULERIO; AND GAWKER MEDIA GROUP, INC., A/K/A GAWKER MEDIA, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2015-04-17
No. 2D14-2630
NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
162 So. 3d 1116 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

Hulk Hogan sued Gawker and related defendants for publishing an article and video about his private sexual encounter. Kinja, a Hungarian company defendant, appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action, arguing the trial court erred by denying the motion without conducting a proper jurisdictional hearing.


Holding

The court reversed the order denying Kinja's motion to dismiss and remanded the case because the circuit court erred in denying the motion without conducting a proper hearing on the jurisdictional issue consistent with the procedures outlined in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court errs in denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without affording the parties a full hearing on the jurisdictional objection.

[2] A written order denying a motion to dismiss must clearly differentiate between grounds for dismissal, especially when a ruling on one ground is deferred.

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Key Quotes

“In the absence of such a hearing, the circuit court erred in denying Kinja's motion to dismiss.”

The core holding that the denial of the motion was improper without a proper jurisdictional hearing

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Facts & Procedural History

Terry Gene Bollea (Hulk Hogan) filed suit against multiple defendants, including Kinja (a Hungarian limited liability company), for publishing a narra…

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Opinion of the Court
WALLACE, Judge.

*1117WALLACE, Judge.

Terry Gene Bollea, who is better known by his ring name as “Hulk Hogan,” filed an action against multiple defendants asserting various claims arising out of the publication and distribution of a narrative about his extramarital sexual encounter, including excerpts of a video recording of the event.1 A Hungarian limited liability company, Blogwire Hungary Szellemi Al-kotst Hasznost, KFT, now known as Kinja, KFT (Kinja), is one of the defendants named in the action. Kinja filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Bollea’s first amended complaint on two grounds: (1) the failure to state a cause of action against Kinja; and (2) the lack of personal jurisdiction over Kinja.

On January 17, 2014, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Kinja’s motion to dismiss. Four months later, on May 14, 2014, the circuit court entered an order memorializing the ruling made at the January hearing. In that order, the circuit court ruled as follows: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Kinja’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (regarding jurisdiction) and for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Kinja may renew its motion after [Bollea] has an opportunity to take additional jurisdictional discovery.”

At a subsequent hearing held on April 23, 2014, the circuit court once again considered Kinja’s motion to dismiss. The transcript of the circuit court’s ruling at that hearing reflects that the court decided to deny the first ground of Kinja’s motion to dismiss, i.e., the failure to state a cause of action, but once again deferred a definitive ruling on the second ground, i.e., the lack of personal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the written order entered after the hearing does not differentiate between the two separate grounds on which Kinja’s motion is based. Instead, the order, which was also entered on May 14, 2014, simply declares: “[The][m]otion to dismiss of Defendant Kinja, KFT is DENIED.”2 Kinja has appealed both of the May 14 orders.

As the foregoing procedural history demonstrates, neither of the parties has ever had an opportunity for a full hearing — whether non — evidentiary or eviden-tiary-on the merits of Kinja’s jurisdictional objection in accordance with the procedures outlined in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502-03 (Fla.1989). In the absence of such a hearing, the circuit court erred in denying Kinja’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Kinja’s motion to dismiss and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Canale v. Rubin, 20 So.3d 463, 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Bellairs v. Mohrmann, 716 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


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Cited By

  • Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 170 So. 3d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
    …answers and affirmative defenses to Bollea’s complaint, Blogwire had not done so. On April 17, 2015, this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on Blog-wire’s motion to dismiss. Blogwire Hung. Szellemi Alkotst Hasznost, KFT v. Bollea, 162 So. 3d 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). While Blogwire’s appeal was pending in the fall of 2014, Bollea grew eager to place at least part of the action at issue. He moved the circuit court to sever the claims against Blogwire from the balance of the case and to set th…
    1 / 2
  • Fountainbleau, LLC v. Hire US, Inc., 273 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
    …. Frier, 13 So. 3d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ("To fall within the scope of [rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i)], . . . an order must actually make a determination as to personal jurisdiction."); cf. Blogwire Hungary Szellemi Alkotást Hasznosító v. Bollea, 162 So. 3d 1116, 1117 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Although the circuit court apparently intended once again to defer a ruling on the jurisdictional aspect of [the] motion to dismiss, the order denying the motion to dismiss does not incorporate such a reservation. .…

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