MARCUS S. ROBERTSON, APPELLANT,
v.
VIRGINIA S. ROBERTSON, APPELLEE
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Marcus Robertson appealed a trial court's issuance of an injunction for protection against stalking based on his conduct toward his ex-wife Virginia Robertson. The appellate court affirmed the injunction, finding sufficient evidence that Robertson's repeated nighttime visits to her home while shining a flashlight into her windows constituted stalking under Florida law.
The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the injunction. Robertson's three consecutive nights of visiting his ex-wife's home, shining a flashlight into her windows, established a course of conduct that caused substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose, meeting the statutory definition of stalking.
[1] A "course of conduct" for purposes of stalking statutes includes a series of acts over a period of time, however short, that evidences a continuity of purpose.
[2] Harassment, under stalking statutes, requires a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpos…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This "course of conduct" includes "a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose."”
Establishes the statutory definition of course of conduct required for stalking under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobertson went to his ex-wife's home on three consecutive nights without invitation or warning, shining a flashlight into her darkened windows while w…
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Appellant Marcus Robertson appeals the trial court’s entry of an injunction for protection against stalking based on Appellant’s conduct towards Appellee Virginia Robertson, his ex-wife. Appellant argues there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments and, accordingly, affirm the entry of the injunction.
Section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2013), criminalizes “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” To harass, is “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat (2013). This “course of conduct” includes “a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013).
*88Here, there was uncontroverted evidence that the Appellant went to Appel-lee’s home for three consecutive nights. Security camera footage showed him shining a flashlight into her home while walking around her property. These three incidents, which were further verified by Appellant’s e-mail to Appellee admitting to being at her residence, establish “a course of conduct” sufficient to support the trial court’s entry of the injunction against Appellant.
Furthermore, unlike the actions in Touhey v. Seda, 133 So.3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), Appellant’s conduct was of the sort to cause substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose. In Touhey, the Second District overturned an injunction for stalking where the alleged stalker visited the petitioner’s office once and twice called the office to inquire as to the petitioner’s whereabouts. Id. at 1204. The Second District held that these limited actions would not cause a reasonable person to suffer “substantial emotional distress.” Id. Here, on the other hand, Appellant came to Appellee’s home in the middle of the night, uninvited and without warning, and looked inside her darkened windows with a flashlight. And, he did this the next night. And, a third night. These repeated actions are sufficient to cause emotional distress in a reasonable person.
There was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant had stalked Appellee under the terms of section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2013). Therefore, the trial court’s entry of the injunction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…39, 1040-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (evidence that respondent had made several attempts to talk to petitioner and that she did not feel comfortable around him did not amount to stalking under a “reasonable person” standard), with Robertson v. Robertson, 164 So. 3d 87, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (respondent’s conduct of looking inside petitioner’s house in the middle of the night with a flashlight, uninvited and without warning, for three consecutive nights was a course of conduct causing substantial emotional distre…
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Caterino v. Torello, 276 So. 3d 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…16) (reversing injunction for protection against stalking because a reasonable person would not suffer substantial emotional distress when respondent "banged on [petitioner's] door and left her a letter and a check"), with Robertson v. Robertson, 164 So. 3d 87, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (affirming entry of injunction for protection against stalking because respondent's conduct of looking inside petitioner's house in the middle of the night with a flashlight, uninvited and without warning, for three consec…
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Sinopoli v. Clark, 290 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…2016) (reversing injunction for protection against stalking because a reasonable person would not suffer substantial emotional distress when respondent "banged on [petitioner's] door and left her a letter and a check"), with Robertson v. Robertson, 164 So. 3d 87, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (affirming entry of injunction for protection against stalking because respondent's conduct of looking inside petitioner's house in the middle of the night with a flashlight, uninvited and without warning, for three consecuti…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)