CHRISTOPHER EDWARD CARROLL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a postconviction motion cannot be denied as time-barred if it is timely on its face, and the trial court must attach record evidence if denying it as procedurally barred.
[1] A postconviction motion should not be denied as untimely if it is timely on its face.
[2] An order denying a postconviction motion as procedurally barred may be reversed if the record does not demonstrate the defendant is not entitled to relief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant filed a motion under Rule 3.801, which the trial court dismissed as untimely. The appellant alleged his sentence was imposed on Septembe…
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Christopher Edward Carroll appeals from an order dismissing his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure B.801. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. We reverse for further proceedings.
It is improper to deny a postconviction motion as time-barred where the motion is timely on its face. See Martinez v. State, 842 So.2d 900, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), Further, an order denying a postconviction motion as procedurally barred may be reversed where the record does not reflect that the defendant is not entitled to relief. See Salabarria v. State, 100 So.3d 231, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
In the instant case, the appellant alleged in his motion that he was sentenced in all four cases that were the subject of the motion on September 4, 2013. If this allegation is true, the appellant’s motion, filed on September 3, 2014, would be timely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(b) (“No motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 1 year after the sentence becomes final.”). In its order of dismissal, the trial court asserted that the appellant was sentenced in all four cases on June 14, 2013, which would render his motion untimely. See id. (“For sentences imposed prior to July 1, 2013, a motion under this rule may be filed on or before July 1, 2014.”). However, as the state conceded in response to this Court’s Toler1 order, the appellant’s motion was timely on its face and the trial court failed to attach documents demonstrating that the appellant was not entitled to relief.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the appellant’s rule 3.801 motion. On remand, should the trial court again conclude that appellant’s rule 3.801 motion is procedurally barred, it shall attach to its order the portions of the record demonstrating that the appellant is not entitled to relief. Otherwise, it shall consider the motion on the merits.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WOLF, ROWE, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Toler v. State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Martinez v. State, 842 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Salabarria v. State, 100 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)