NATHANIEL WELCH HEWITT, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES FRANK VENABLE, FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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A plaintiff injured when his vehicle struck a railroad engine at an intersection with a traffic control signal appeals the dismissal of his negligence claim against the City of Miami. The Florida District Court of Appeal holds that municipalities are now liable for negligent acts of their employees committed within the scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior, overruling prior case law that distinguished between governmental and proprietary functions.
A municipal corporation is amenable to suit in tort for damages resulting from negligent acts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. The Court overruled the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions previously used to shield municipalities from liability and applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to municipal defendants.
“It is now the established law of this jurisdiction under the doctrine of respondeat superior that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done.”
The Court's statement of the controlling legal principle establishing municipal liability for employee negligence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami maintained and manually operated a traffic control signal at the intersection of Northwest Eleventh Street and Florida East Coast Ra…
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Plaintiff has appealed from and assigns as error an order entered by the trial court dismissing his complaint as to defendant City of Miami. The record on appeal consists of a stipulated statement as permitted by Rule 3.6, subd. h, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A.
The facts recited in the stipulated statement are that the defendant City maintained and manually operated by its agents, servants or employees a traffic control signal on Northwest Eleventh Street at its point of intersection with the tracks of the Florida East Coast Railway Company; that because of negligence of the City’s employee in failing to give warning of the dangerous condition caused by the approach toward and into the intersection of a railroad crossing, the vehicle which the plaintiff was driving struck a railroad engine causing the injuries for which damages are sought.
The parties agree that the question posed for our decision is whether a municipal corporation is amenable to a suit sounding in tort where it is alleged that the municipality was negligent in the manual operation of a traffic control signal by and through its servants, agents or employees.
More than one hundred years ago our Supreme Court held that a municipality was liable for damages resulting from its negligent failure to maintain its streets in a safe condition of repair.1 In decisions which subsequently followed, our court departed from the rule in the Fortune case and drew a distinction between municipal functions performed in a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary capacity. It held that while a municipality may be liable for the negligent acts of its employees committed in the performance of proprietary functions, it was not liable for the consequence of such acts if committed in the performance of governmental functions. This fictional distinction, grounded as it was upon the ancient premise that the King can do no wrong, was receded from and overruled by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Hargrove case.2 It is now the established law of this jurisdiction under the doctrine of respondeat superior that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done.3
The stipulated statement which constitutes the record on appeal in this case is silent as to whether the complaint alleges that the negligent act of the City’s employee was committed within the scope of his employment or whether the negligence alleged was the proximate cause of the damages claimed by plaintiff. Since these issues are not included in the question presented by the parties for our decision, and are not mentioned by them in their briefs, we hold that they are not before us for consideration.
In support of the trial court’s order of dismissal, appellee relies upon the decision of our Supreme Court in the Avey case.4 It was there held that a municipality was not liable in tort for the failure of an electrically operated traffic light signal to function in a proper manner. There was no showing that the failure of the traffic light was the proximate cause of the damages suffered. To the extent, if any, that *187the Avey decision is in conflict with the rule enunciated in the Hargrove case, it is to that extent overruled.
The order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.
HORTON, Acting C. J., and PEARSON, J., concur.
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Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. City OF Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985)…l duty does not' preclude a finding of liability based on a concurrent special duty. First National Bank of Key West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933); Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961); Hewitt v. Venable, 109 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); et al. See also Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E. 2d 1292 (1984), for a cogent examination of the substance of the doctrine as applied in Massachusetts. . I differ from him in two basic respects. First, I am persuad…
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Modlin v. The City OF Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967)…argrove decision. We do not have any difficulty in placing a duty of care on a municipality that undertakes the manual operation of a railroad crossing signal toward a motorist attempting to negotiate that crossing, Hewitt v. Venable, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So. 2d 185, or in placing on police officers a duty not to deprive those with whom they come in contact of their constitutional rights of privacy, integrity of person, and so forth, Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.App.1961, 130 So. 2d 105; Simpson v. Cit…
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The City OF Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…Fla.1967), 201 So. 2d 70. . (Fla.1957), 96 So. 2d 130. . See, e. g., Evanoff v. City of St. Peters-burg (Fla.App.2d 1966), 186 So. 2d 68; Thompson v. City of Jacksonville (Fla.App.1st 1961), 130 So. 2d 105; and Hewitt v. Venable (Fla.App.3d 1959), 109 So. 2d 185. . See Holton v. City of Bartow (Fla.1953), 68 So. 2d 385. . We must assume, from the context in which the court made the pronouncement, that it was talking about all agents and employees of the municipality. . (3Tla.App.3d 1963), 155 So. 2d 829.…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ervine Hargrove v. Town OF Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
- The City of Tallahassee v. Justus R. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (Fla. 1850)
- Avey v. City OF W. Paim Beach, 152 Fla. 717 (Fla. 1943)
- Quiller D. Ragans v. City OF Jacksonville, 106 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)