DENCO, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM B. BELK, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the appellant could not use its own action of purchasing the property for a lump sum to defeat the appellee's contractual right of first refusal. The court found no error in the chancellor's method of allocating the price to the leased property.
The court held that the appellant cannot rely on its own action of purchasing the property for a lump sum to defeat the appellee's contractual rights under his first refusal option. The chancellor's method of allocating a proportionate part of the total price to the property covered by the option was not in error.
“They cannot now, in good conscience, rely on this act to defeat the rights of appellee under his contract.”
Establishes that the appellant's actions should not be used to circumvent the appellee's contractual rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDenco, Inc. purchased a property that included a portion leased by William B. Belk, who held a first refusal option on that portion. Denco purchased t…
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This case has previously been before the Supreme Court; Denco, Inc. v. Belk, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 261, and many of the questions raised by appellant are proscribed by the opinion entered therein. The remaining objections, relating to the uncertainty of the price allocable to the property leased by appellee, and the chancellor’s method of determination, are occasioned by appellant’s own act, i. e., purchasing the property in question, together with other properties, for a lump sum payment, with knowledge of appellee’s first refusal option. They cannot now, in good conscience, rely on this act to defeat the rights of appellee under his contract. See cases cited in 12 Fla.Jur., Equity, Section 55. We find no error inherent in the chancellor’s method of allocating a proportionate part of the total price to the property covered by appellee’s option.
As to appellant’s contention that the principles set out in Brenner v. Duncan, 1947, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W.2d 320, are not the law of this case because our Supreme Court in its previous consideration-of the present case merely referred to Brenner v. Duncan as “persuasive in this connection”, *202 it will suffice to say that it is now the law of the case. [97 So.2d 265.]
Affirmed.
KANNER, C. J., and ALLEN and SHANNON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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The Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…ement of Contracts, Section 295 (1932) ; 3A Corbin on Contracts, Section 767 (1951). Viewing the allegations most favorable to the pleader, we find that Count I of the second amended complaint meets this test. See, Denco, Inc. v. Belk, Fla.App.1959, 109 So. 2d 201; Brenner v. Duncan, 1947, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. 2d 320. Whether in fact the notice which Reagan gave appellant was proper and effectual to invoke the right of first refusal will undoubtedly become an issue to be tried when appellees file their answer…
Authorities Cited
- Denco, Inc. v. Belk, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957)
- State of Fla. on Relation of Mortg. Inv. Found., Inc. v. Knott, 97 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1957)