CRAIG PARHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Craig Parham challenged the trial court's revocation of his probation, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because his probationary period had expired before he was served with the probation warrant. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of his habeas corpus petition, holding that probation was properly tolled when the violation affidavit was filed, the warrant issued, and a detainer placed with the Department of Corrections in 1997, well before expiration.
The trial court properly revoked Parham's probation because under State v. Boyd, the probation was properly tolled by the filing of the probation violation affidavit, the issuance of the probation warrant, and the placement of a detainer with the Department of Corrections in 1997, all of which occurred well before the expiration of the probation period.
[1] A probation period is tolled by the filing of a probation violation affidavit, the issuance of a probation warrant, and the delivery of the warrant to the Department of C…
[2] A detainer placed by law enforcement with the Department of Corrections serves as evidence of the delivery of an active probation warrant to the Department of Corrections…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant's probation was properly tolled because of the filing of the probation violation affidavit, the issuance of the probation warrant, and the delivery of the warrant to the Department of Corrections in 1997, as evidenced by the detainer placed by the Metro-Dade Police Department”
Establishes the legal standard for tolling probation under State v. Boyd and the court's rationale for finding jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParham was sentenced in 1995 as a habitual violent felony offender to jail time plus five years of probation. In 1996, while on probation, he was arre…
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Defendant, .Craig Parham, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habe-as corpus. We affirm.
In 1994, the defendant was arrested and charged with burglary to a dwelling and grand theft in the third degree. In July 1995, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to jail time, followed by five years of probation. Because the defendant had already served the length of his jail sentence at the time of the plea, the five-year probationary portion of his sentence began immediately.
In 1996, and while on probation, he was arrested for two new burglaries committed in Pinellas County. In January 1997, the Department of Probation in Miami-Dade County filed a probation violation affidavit, alleging that these 1996 Pinellas County burglaries constituted a violation of his 1995 probation. Subsequently, a probation warrant was issued and, on October 7, 1997, the Metro-Dade Police Department placed a detainer on the defendant with the Department of Corrections, pursuant to the active probation warrant.1 The defendant was then served with the active probation warrant on January 3, 2001, and was. returned to Miami-Dade County, *508where his probation was revoked on March 6, 2001, and he was sentenced to twenty years in state prison. On August 19, 2012, the defendant was placed on conditional release by the Department of Corrections and was released from prison. However, he was again arrested for burglary to a dwelling on February 27, 2013, in a case that remains open and pending.
The defendant asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the probationary period had not been properly tolled and had therefore expired by the time he was served with it in 2001. The State correctly argued below that under State v. Boyd, 717 So.2d 524 (Fla.1998), the defendant’s probation was properly tolled because of the filing of the probation violation affidavit, the issuance of the probation warrant, and the delivery of the warrant to the Department of Corrections in 1997, as evidenced by the detainer placed by the Metro-Dade Police Department,2 all of which were well before the expiration of the probation period.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s petition and we, accordingly, affirm.