MICHAEL DORSEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2015-08-04
No. 1D14-195
ROWE, SWANSON, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
169 So. 3d 1286 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for unlawful use of a computer service in all respects but one. Appellant filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), claiming it was error to impose sex offender probation because unlawful use of a computer service was not an enumerated offense under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2012). The trial court granted the motion and, over appellant’s objection, attempted to remedy the error by selectively imposing special conditions of sex offender probation at resen-tencing. We agree with appellant that this violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See Snow v. State, 157 So.3d 559, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court strike the special conditions of sex offender probation. Id.

*1287AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with directions.

ROWE, SWANSON, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.


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  • Levandoski v. State, 245 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 2018)
    …10)." (emphasis omitted) ); see also Staples v. State , 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (using the term "sex offender probation" to refer to the conditions in section 948.30 ); Adams v. State , 979 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 2008) (same); Dorsey v. State , 169 So. 3d 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (same); Harroll v. State , 960 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (same); State v. Springer , 965 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (same). We nevertheless encourage trial courts to be as specific as possible during sentencing in order…
  • Loza v. Marin, 198 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
    …Kern, 360 So. 2d at 484).2 Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support relating to the son, and [*1023] reverse the order of the trial court. See Larwa v. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Roush, 169 So. 3d 1286, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (per curiam); cf. Gamache v. Gamache, 14 So. 3d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that a trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over child custody issues, where the adult dependent child was over eighteen years…

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