STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
D.A., A CHILD, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2015-08-12
No. 4D14-2564
GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.
171 So. 3d 229 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The State appealed a trial court's sua sponte dismissal of a juvenile delinquency petition. The court reversed, holding that trial courts lack authority to unilaterally dismiss delinquency petitions before adjudication based on section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes, absent a motion to dismiss.


Holding

Trial courts lack authority to sua sponte dismiss a delinquency petition before the initial adjudicatory hearing. Section 985.0301(6) authorizes courts to terminate jurisdiction only after the initial adjudicatory hearing, not before adjudication on the merits.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court cannot sua sponte dismiss a petition for delinquency before the initial adjudicatory hearing based on a statute authorizing the court to end its jurisdictio…

[2] A trial court lacks the authority to sua sponte dismiss a prosecution when no motion to dismiss has been filed.

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Key Quotes

“is fairly viewed as authorizing the court to elect to end its jurisdiction over a child at any time following the initial adjudicatory hearing — not as permitting the trial court to use its discretion to terminate jurisdiction to put an end to the prosecution before the case ever reaches adjudication on the merits.”

Establishes that section 985.0301(6) permits jurisdictional termination only after adjudication, not before

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Facts & Procedural History

The State filed a delinquency petition against D.A. in January 2012 for trespassing on school grounds. D.A. failed to appear for intake into a juvenil…

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Opinion of the Court
DAMOORGIAN, J.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s final order sua sponte dismissing its petition for delinquency. We reverse and hold that the trial court imper-missibly relied on section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes (2014), to sua sponte dismiss the petition before the initial adjudicatory hearing. See State v. W.D., 112 So.3d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

By way of background, the State filed a delinquency petition against D.A. in January of 2012, based on allegations that he trespassed on school grounds. D.A. was scheduled for intake into a juvenile diver*230sion program, but failed to appear on the scheduled date. D.A. then was issued a capias in April of 2012 for failure to appear. At the hearing on the petition more than two years later, the State informed the trial court that, from its understanding, D.A. was on a pickup order status. After noting it appeared that the State had declined to extradite D.A. after he was arrested in Colorado, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the petition for delinquency.

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on our holding in W.D.1 In that case, we held that section 985.0301(6) “is fairly viewed as authorizing the court to elect to end its jurisdiction over a child at any time following the initial adjudicatory hearing — not as permitting the trial court to use its discretion to terminate jurisdiction to put an end to the prosecution before the case ever reaches adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 704 (emphasis added). Furthermore, a trial court is without authority to sua sponte dismiss a criminal prosecution “where, as here, no motion to dismiss has been filed.” State v. C.W., No. 4D14-1820, 2015 WL 3761242, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). By sua sponte dismissing the delinquency petition, the trial court improperly encroached upon the State’s discretion to prosecute D.A. See id. Thus, in light of our holding in W.D. and C.W., we reverse and remand the trial court’s order dismissing the State’s delinquency petition.

Reversed and remanded.

GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. J.Q., 178 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …or delinquency against J.Q., a minor. We agree with the state’s contention that the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing the petition prior to an adjudicatory hearing and we reverse. We recently addressed a similar dismissal in State v. D.A., 171 So. 3d 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), where we explained: On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on our holding in [State v. W.D., 112 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ]. In that case, we held that section 985.0301(6)…

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