JONATHAN STARKS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a pro se defendant's motion to withdraw plea as untimely, holding that the motion should be treated as a timely ineffective assistance of counsel petition under rule 3.850 to avoid forfeiture of postconviction relief.
When a defendant files a motion to withdraw plea after the deadline, the trial court should treat it as a rule 3.850 ineffective assistance of counsel motion if it meets procedural requirements and timely filing would otherwise be forfeited.
[1] A motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the deadline should be treated as a rule 3.850 ineffective assistance of counsel motion if doing so prevents forfeiture of…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant files a motion to withdraw plea under rule 3.170(f), but the time to file such a motion has passed, the postconviction court should consider it under rule 3.850 so long as it meets the procedural requirements under that rule.”
Court citing Davis v. State for the governing standard on converting late motions to withdraw plea into rule 3.850 motions.
Appellant Starks, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his defense counsel had given him misadvice before he en…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rule 3.850 cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant pro se appeals the trial court’s dismissal of a motion to withdraw plea as untimely and argues that the trial court should have treated the motion as a petition for ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s misadvice before Appellant entered his plea. We agree.1 See Davis v. State, 154 So.3d 1203, 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“When a defendant files a motion to withdraw plea under rule 3.170(0, but the time to file such a motion has passed, the postconviction court should consider it under rule 3.850 so long as it meets the procedural *1080requirements under that rule.” (citing Franklin v. State, 31 So.3d 948, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010))). Often, in this situation, we affirm the trial court’s ruling without prejudice for the appellant to timely file a rule 3.850 motion. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 116 So.3d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). In this case, Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea, if interpreted as a rule 3.850 motion, was timely filed. See Pearson v. State, 141 So.3d 722, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Ramos v. State, 658 So.2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). However, considering that the time to file a motion for post-conviction relief will likely expire or leave very little time to timely file a rule 3.850 motion, perhaps a matter of days, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion, remand for the trial court to treat it as a timely filed rule 3.850 motion, and allow amendment if necessary.
REVERSED and REMANDED with INSTRUCTIONS.
ORFINGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Ramos v. State, 658 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Pearson v. State, 141 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
- Franklin v. State, 31 So. 3d 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
- Anderson v. State, 116 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)
- Davis v. State, 154 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)