MARTHA PICKSTON, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS MARTHA DOUGHERTY, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES G. DOUGHERTY, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1959-03-06
No. 794
SHANNON, J., and STURGIS, WALLACE E., A. J., concur.
109 So. 2d 577 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1959) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Martha Pickston sought an annulment from Charles Dougherty without providing corroborating testimony to support the grounds for annulment. The trial court declined to grant the annulment, and the appellate court held that Florida law requires corroborating testimony for all annulment decrees, regardless of whether the defendant appears to defend.


Holding

Florida requires corroborating testimony for all annulment decrees. No decree for annulment may be granted upon the mere uncorroborated testimony of one party, and this rule cannot be modified even when the defendant fails to appear or defend.


Key Quotes

“no decree for annulment of marriage may be granted upon the mere uncorroborated testimony of one of the parties to the action”

States the core holding that corroborating testimony is mandatory in annulment cases

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Martha Pickston filed for annulment of her marriage to Charles Dougherty. Service was made on Dougherty by constructive process through publication, a…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
KANNER, Chief Judge.

KANNER, Chief Judge.

Appellant sought decree for annulment of the marriage she had entered into with the appellee. Service upon appellee was by constructive process through publication. Since appellee did not appear to defend, a decree pro confesso was entered. The chancellor refused to grant the decree, determining that “there is no corroboration of anything basic to the cause of action.”

The facts are of an indelicate nature and a recital of them is not needed in the consideration of the question presented on this appeal. Apellant concedes that there is a lack of corroborative testimony. Her position is that “under the circumstances in this case, corroboration is neither possible nor required.” So the question hinges upon the single proposition of whether corroborative testimony is a requisite for an annulment decree.

Appellant recognizes that long ago Florida adopted the corroboration rule in divorce suits but urges that an annulment action is different from one of divorce and that, therefore, the chancellor has or should have the discretionary power in annulment suits to determine under the facts of each case whether corroborating testimony should be required.

We hold that no decree for annulment of marriage may be granted upon the mere uncorroborated testimony of one of the parties to the action. This rule may not be modified when the defendant does not defend. Keezer on Marriage and Divorce, Third Edition, section 233, p. 292; 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 58c, p. 940, and 35 Am.Jur., Marriage, section 130, p. 259. The *578state having a vital interest in the marriage relation, the “conscience of the court” should be assured that testimony given will not operate to destroy the marriage through collusion, fraud, or coercion. The prime object of the corroboration doctrine is to prevent collusion and to forestall any attempt which might otherwise be made to destroy the marital relationship falsely.

The chancellor could not have reached any result other than refusal to grant a decree of annulment. His decree is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

SHANNON, J., and STURGIS, WALLACE E., A. J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Posner v. Sari Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970)
    …orce suit the state is a third party whose interests take precedence over the private interests of the spouses. See Underwood v. Underwood, 1868, 12 Fla. 434; Light v. Meginniss, 1945, 156 Fla. 61, 22 So. 2d 455; Pickston v. Dougherty, Fla.App.1959, 109 So. 2d 577; Wall v. Wall, Fla.App.1961, 134 So. 2d 288. The state’s interest in the preservation of the marriage is the basis for the rule that a divorce cannot be awarded by consent of the parties, see Underwood v. Underwood, supra, 12 Fla. 434, as well as t…
    1 / 2
  • Williams v. Williams, 214 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
    …the alleged condition.” Another reason exists why the judgment of annulment should be reversed, and that is lack of corroboration of Thomas’s testimony on the issue of annulment. This 2nd District Court in Pickston v. [*51] Dougherty, Fla.App.1959, 109 So. 2d 577, 91 A.L.R.2d 618, held that: “No decree for annulment of marriage may be granted upon the mere uncorroborated testimony of one of the parties to the action.” Elimination of the annulment issue leaves in the instant case only the counterclaim of Ca…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw