RANDY SCOTT MUNROE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because section 316.605(1) prohibits obstruction of a license tag's alphanumeric designation by any matter, whether on or external to the tag, and the court certified conflict with Harris v. State's contrary interpretation.
Section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits obstruction of a license tag's alphanumeric designation by any matter, including external objects, and does not distinguish between obscuring matter on the tag versus external matter obscuring the tag.
[1] Section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits obstruction of a license tag's alphanumeric designation by any matter, whether placed on the tag or external to it, and th…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statutory catchall phrase 'other obscuring matter' does not distinguish from obscuring matter 'on' the license tag versus external matter obscuring the tag”
The court's interpretation of section 316.605(1)'s plain language regarding what constitutes prohibited obstruction of a license tag.
Appellant's vehicle had an obstructed license tag, and the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop based on th…
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Anticipating our decision in Baker v. State, 164 So.3d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, reading “the plain language of section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes [], to mean that a license tag’s alphanumeric designation may not be obstructed by any matter.” Id. at 151, 155 (noting that “the statutory catchall phrase ‘other obscuring matter’ does not distinguish from obscuring matter ‘on’ the license tag versus external matter obscuring the tag”); see State v. English, 148 So.3d 529, 529-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that, under the plain reading of section 316.605(1), an officer had the authority to stop a vehicle where the license tag’s alphanumeric designation was obstructed by a hanging tag light and its attached wires), review granted, English v. State, 171 So.3d 115 (Fla.2015). But see Harris v. State, 11 So.3d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that section 316.605(1) requires a “license plate [to] be free from obscuring matter, be it grease, grime, or some other material placed over the plate,” but that “Matters external to the tag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not covered by the statute.”). As we did in Baker, we certify conflict with Harris.
Affirmed; conflict certified.
BENTON, ROWE, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Shombie S. Harris v. State, 11 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- State v. English, 148 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)
- Baker v. State, 164 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)