ANDRE SHEFFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Andre Sheffield appealed the imposition of a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for possession of cocaine, arguing the crime does not qualify as an enumerated felony under Florida law. The court agreed and reversed, finding that possession of cocaine neither constitutes an enumerated offense nor involves the use or threat of physical force, and therefore cannot support a PRR sentence.
The court held that possession of cocaine is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute and does not involve the use or threat of physical force against an individual, and therefore cannot support a PRR sentence. The trial court's reasoning that the cocaine possession charge qualified because it occurred simultaneously with the violent offenses was rejected.
[1] A Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence is illegal if imposed for a felony that is not enumerated in the PRR statute and does not involve the use or threat of physica…
[2] Possession of cocaine is not an enumerated felony under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The appellant's PRR sentence for possession of cocaine is illegal, as possession of cocaine is not an enumerated offense and does not involve the use or threat of physical force.”
This establishes the core holding that cocaine possession cannot support a PRR sentence because it lacks both enumeration and the required force element.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1998, Sheffield was convicted of three counts: aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, and possession …
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The appellant filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), challenging the imposition of a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for possession of cocaine. Upon the State’s proper concession of error, we reverse and remand the denial of the motion.
In 1998, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (count I), resisting an officer with violence (count II), and possession of cocaine (count III). He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as a PRR for count I, 5 years’ imprisonment as a PRR for count II, and 5 years’ imprisonment as a PRR for count III. All the sentences were imposed consecutively to each other.
The appellant alleges that his PRR sentence for possession of cocaine (count III) is illegal because that crime is not an enumerated felony that qualifies for PRR sentencing. According to section 775.082(8)(a)l., Florida Statutes (1998),1 a PRR is a defendant who commits certain enumerated felonies within 3 years after his or her release from prison. Possession of cocaine is not an enumerated felony. The trial court found that the crime qualified under section 775.082(8)(a)l.(o), which allowed a PRR sentence for “any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force against an individual.” The trial court reasoned that the appellant possessed the cocaine at the time he committed the aggravated assault and resisting offenses, and therefore, the possession charge qualified as an offense that involved the threat of force or violence. We reject the trial court’s reasoning.
The appellant’s PRR sentence for possession of cocaine is illegal, as possession of cocaine is not an enumerated offense and does not involve the use or threat of physical force. See Gonzalez v. State, 810 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence the appellant on count III. The appellant shall have the right to be present on resentencing. See Lamb v. State, 32 So.3d 117, 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ROBERTS, C.J., BENTON, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Washington v. State, 199 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…t a PRR designation is improper for a felony battery conviction under section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes, because that statute merely reclassifies simple battery as a felony battery based on a prior battery conviction); see also Sheffield v. State, 177 So. 3d 699, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (concluding that the appellant’s PRR sentence for possession of cocaine was illegal because that offense is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute and does not involve the use or threat of physical force). Moreover…
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Sheffield v. State, 214 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…PER CURIAM. Previously, in Sheffield v. State, 177 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), this court reversed appellant’s prison releasee reof-fender sentence for possession of cocaine (count III) and remanded for resentencing because possession of cocaine was not a qualifying offense under the prison releas-ee reoff…
Authorities Cited
- Jovan Lamb v. State, 32 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- Gonzalez v. State, 810 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)