PATRICIA SUKONIK, APPELLANT,
v.
HOLLY WALLACK, APPELLEE
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Patricia Sukonik appealed a trial court's order dismissing her estate dispute case as a sanction for willful failure to comply with discovery requests and court orders. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding ample record support for the trial court's determination that Sukonik's noncompliance was deliberate and contumacious.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record amply supported the finding that Sukonik's repeated failures to comply with discovery obligations and court orders constituted willful and contumacious disregard of the court's authority, justifying dismissal as the most severe sanction in extreme circumstances.
[1] A trial court has discretion to determine discovery sanctions, and such determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[2] Dismissal of a cause of action is the most severe discovery sanction and should be employed only in extreme circumstances.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“entering a default because a party did not comply with discovery orders "is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances."”
Establishes the high threshold for dismissal as a discovery sanction, requiring deliberate and contumacious disregard of court authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSukonik and Wallack are sisters disputing administration of their mother's estate since 2007. Sukonik, living in Pennsylvania, initiated adversarial p…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Patricia Sukonik (“Sukonik”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Holly Wallack’s (“Wallack”) motion to dismiss or strike Sukonik’s pleadings for failing to comply with discovery requests and for disobeying court orders. Because the trial court’s order finding that Sukonik’s repeated failure to comply with her discovery obligations and the trial court’s orders was willful, deliberate, and contumacious is amply supported by the record, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sukonik, who lives in Pennsylvania, and Wallack, who lives in Florida, are sisters. The sisters have disputed aspects of the administration of their late mother’s estate since she died in 2007. In 2009, Sukonik Sled a petition for administration, and. in August of 2012, Sukonik, who was represented by Michael Greenwald (“Green-wald”), initiated adversarial proceedings to determine the assets of the estate. The adversarial trial was to commence on March 10, 2014, with discovery and mediation scheduled for January and February, 2014.
On December 19, 2013, Wallack delivered initial discovery requests giving Su-konik until January 20, 2014 to respond. However, prior to the expiration of that deadline, Greenwald filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which the trial court granted on January 23, 2014. After granting Greenwald’s motion to withdraw, the trial court gave Sukonik until February 28, 2014 to retain new counsel; extended the discovery and mediation deadlines; reset the trial to September 8, 2014; and entered a pretrial order specifying that all witness lists and exhibits must be filed no later than forty-five days prior to trial and cautioning that the failure to comply with the order could result in severe sanctions, including dismissal of the cause of action.
Thereafter, Wallack resent her discovery package, providing Sukonik with another thirty days to respond, but Sukonik failed to respond by the new deadline. Wallack also attempted to schedule a deposition with Sukonik, offering a variety of dates for her to choose from, several of them occurring well after the deadline set by the trial court for Sukonik to retain new counsel. In response, Sukonik filed a motion for a protective order and sent Wallack a letter, stating that she “will not respond to aforesaid letters, or for that matter to any other mailing [Wallack] might send.”
In addition to filing for a protective order, Sukonik filed a motion to extend her time to find counsel. The trial court granted Sukonik an extension to retain counsel until March 24, 2014, but stated that no further extensions would be granted. The trial court also ordered Sukonik to schedule a deposition with Wallack by April 3,2014, and to comply with Wallack’s discovery requests by April 4, 2014. Suko-nik did not retain new counsel and chose to proceed pro se, did not meet the deadline to schedule her deposition, and failed to produce a single document in compliance with Wallack’s requests for production.1
*457After conducting separate hearings on Sukonik’s motion for a protective order against being compelled to travel to Florida and on Wallack’s motion to compel Su-konik to attend a deposition and mediation in Florida, the trial court entered an order granting Wallack’s motion to compel attendance and requiring, Sukonik to physically appear for her deposition on July 30, 2014 and . mediation on August 6, 2014. The trial court repeated its warning that failure to comply with its orders could result in the dismissal of the case.
Sukonik did not appear for her,scheduled deposition. Instead, she sent a letter to the mediator and the trial court protesting the authority of the court and stating in relevant part that “[t]his Mediation was initially arranged without my approval ... I will not be attending this Mediation.”
On August 1, 2014, Sukonik requested a continuance and a 120-day stay of discovery, claiming that she had retained counsel (who she did not identify) to represent her, with the caveat that the counsel would be unavailable until after the scheduled September 8, 2014 trial date. After conducting a hearing on August 13 to consider both Sukonik’s motion for a continuance and Wallack’s motion to dismiss for Suko-nik’s allegedly willful disregard for the trial court’s orders, the trial court granted Wallack’s motion to dismiss and provided detailed justifications for its decision. Su-konik appealed.
ANALYSIS
A trial court has the discretion to determine discovery sanction's, and such determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla.2004). We must therefore apply the “reasonableness test” to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id; (éxplaining that “if reasonable people could differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s action,-the action'is not unreasonable”). ' ’ ■
It is undeniable that entering a default because a .party did not comply with discovery orders “is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed pply ,jn extreme circumstances.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla.1983). However, it is justified where a party shows “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority” or “willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court.” Id. To ensure that the trial court consciously determines that the misconduct was more than neglect, it- is required to find that the noncompliant party willfully or deliberately disregarded the court’s directions. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tubero, 569 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla.1990).2
In the instant case, the trial, court issued a very thorough order justifying its decision to dismiss Sukonik’s claim. The trial court found that Sukonik’s failure to comply with its orders was a willful and contumacious disregard of the trial court’s *458authority. This finding is fully supported by the record. Sukonik failed to: (1) comply with the trial court’s order resetting the case for trial and its pretrial instruc-. tions requiring Sukonik to submit her witness list and .trial exhibits to opposing counsel, and file the same with the clerk of court; (2) respond to. Wallack’s discovery requests for production of documents; (8) retain counsel within the . court ordered time frame despite obtaining substantial time to retain new counsel, thereby delaying the trial, and waiting until the eve of trial to claim that she had found new counsel — an anonymous attorney — -who would be unable to represent her until well after the September’ 8, 2014 trial date; and (4) appear for the court-ordered mediation and her court-ordered deposition.3 The trial court noted that although Sukonik was proceeding pro se, she had previously been licensed to practice law in the state of Pennsylvania, and she provided no reasonable explanation for heir failure to'identify the name or address of a single witness she intended to' call at trial' or to comply with the court’s orders, despite the trial court’s multiple attempts to accommodate her. Because the record supports the trial court’s'findings, we find no abuse of discretion and therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
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CAL v. Forward AIR Solutions, Inc., 199 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…a complaint as a sanction if it finds that a party has willfully disregarded a court order. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946. While dismissing a complaint as a sanction for a violation of a discovery order is the most severe remedy, see Sukonik v. Wallack, 178 So. 3d 455, 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), reh’g denied, (Nov. 18, 2015), such a remedy is available to trial courts, and we reiterate the adage that “[a] party may not ignore a valid order of court except at its peril.” Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 978,…
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Authorities Cited
- Mercer v. J.D. Raine, Sr., 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983)
- Carolann D. Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1993)
- Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Moshe Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1990)
- HAM v. Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2004)
- Ledo v. Seavie Res., LLC, 149 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)