LAURA M. WATSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STEWART TILGHMAN FOX & BIANCHI, P.A., WILLIAM C. HEARON, P.A., TODD S. STEWART, P.A., LARRY S. STEWART AND WILLIAM C. HEARON INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Court affirmed the trial court's order striking plaintiff's complaint as a sham pleading in a libel, slander, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution case, though it recognized error regarding the litigation privilege's application to malicious prosecution claims.
A complaint alleging libel, slander, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution may be struck as a sham pleading without an evidentiary hearing when the court properly exercises its discretion.
[1] The litigation privilege does not bar a malicious prosecution claim where the elements of that tort are satisfied.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The litigation privilege cannot be applied to bar the filing of a claim for malicious prosecution where the elements of that tort are satisfied.”
Court recognized error in applying litigation privilege to malicious prosecution claim, citing Fischer v. Debrincat, 169 So. 3d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
Plaintiff Watson sued defendants Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. and individual attorneys, alleging libel, slander, abuse of process, and malicio…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Abuse Of Process Elements cases and more on FLexlaw
The plaintiff appeals from the circuit court’s order granting the defendants’ sworn motion to strike the plaintiffs complaint — alleging libel and slander, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution — as a sham pleading, and entering final judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff argues the court erred in four respects: (1) striking the complaint as a sham without holding an evidentiary hearing; (2) abusing its discretion in striking the complaint as a sham; (3) finding that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim; and (4) finding that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiffs abuse of process claim.
We affirm on grounds one, two, and four without further discussion. On ground three, we recognize that the circuit court *533erred in finding'that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim, because the court did not have the benefit of our recent decision in Fischer v. Debrincat, 169 So.3d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“The litigation privilege cannot be applied to bar the filing of a-claim for malicious prosecution where the elements of that tort aré satisfied.”)) rev. granted, No. SC15-1477, 2015 WL 5917884 (Fla.2015). However, that error is moot given our affirmance -of the court’s correct decision to strike the plaintiffs complaint as a sham.
Affirmed.
CIKLIN, C.J., GERBEIt, J., and JOHNSON, LAURA, Associate Judge, concur. - .