JACQUELYN NICKERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2015-11-04
No. 3D14-2840
Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG, and SCALES, JJ.
178 So. 3d 538 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The appellate court affirmed a trial court's order retaining jurisdiction over a convicted felon for five years to impose civil restitution lien orders. The court found the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the State's motion, even after the defendant's probation term had technically ended, because a violation of probation was pending.


Holding

Yes, the trial court retained jurisdiction because a violation of probation affidavit was pending before the expiration of her probation term. The court also had jurisdiction to rule on the State's motion to retain jurisdiction for imposing civil restitution liens.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to enter civil restitution lien orders for up to five years from release from supervision, pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Stat…

[2] A trial court maintains jurisdiction when a violation of probation affidavit is pending before the court, even if the scheduled probation term has expired.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the State’s Motion to Retain Jurisdiction and because section 960.292(2) authorizes the trial court to retain such jurisdiction over a convicted felon for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for up .to five years from release from supervision, we affirm the order under review.”

This quote summarizes the court's main reasoning for affirming the trial court's decision.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Jacquelyn Nickerson pleaded guilty to grand theft and was ordered to pay substantial restitution. Her probation was extended. Before her probation end…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
ROTHENBERG, J.

ROTHENBERG, J.

The defendant, Jacquelyn Nickerson, appeals the- trial court’s order granting the State’s Motion Requesting the Court to Retain Jurisdiction (“Motion to Retain jurisdiction”) over the defendant for a period of five years for the sole purpose of imposing civil restitution lien orders pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2014), Because the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the State’s Motion to Retain Jurisdiction and because section 960.292(2) authorizes the trial court to retain such jurisdiction over a convicted felon for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for up .to five years from release from supervision, we affirm the order under review.

On September 26, 1997, the defendant pled guilty to grand theft in the second degree, and she was placed on probation for- fifteen years and ordered to pay over $122,000 in restitution to the victim. The defendant’s -probation was later modified, and her term of probation was extended to November 20,-2012.

The month before the defendant’s term of probation was to terminate, the Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”), filed a violation of probation affidavit, alleging that the defendant failed to make the ordered restitution payments. After numerous continuances, the violation of probation hearing was held, and ultimately, on October 17, 2014, the trial court ruled that the defendant established that she did not have the ability to pay restitution, and *539therefore, did not willfully violate her probation. The State then orally moved for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the defendant for five years for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders in favor of, the victim as set forth in section 960.292(2).. At defense counsel’s request, the trial court ordered the State to file a written motion, but announced that it was “reserving] jurisdiction for purposes of restitution and for determining this motion.” There was no objection from defense counsel.

As requested by defense counsel, the State filed its written Motion to Retain Jurisdiction1 pursuant . to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2014), which provides:

Upon motion, by the state, upon, petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion, the court in which the convicted offender is convicted shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and other aggrieved parties. The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 6 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later.

At a hearing conducted on October 27, 2014, defense counsel argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the State’s motion to retain jurisdiction because the trial court’s jurisdiction over the defendant terminated on November 12, 2012, the date the term of probation was scheduled to expire, or at the latest, on October 17,2014, when the trial court orally ruled that the defendant did not violate her probation by failing to pay restitution. We disagree.

Without rehashing the facts already set forth in this opinion, on November 20, 2012 — the date the defendant’s term of probation was scheduled to terminate absent a violation — the DOO’s violation of probation affidavit was pending before the trial court, and therefore, at that point, the trial court maintained jurisdiction. Thereafter, at the hearing held on October 17, 2014, where the trial court ruled that the defendant had not violated her probation, the trial court clearly stated that it was “reserv[ing] jurisdiction for purposes of restitution and for determining [the State’s written] motion.” Therefore, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the trial court had jurisdiction at the October 24, 2014 hearing to rule on the State’s Motion to Retain Jurisdiction. Finally, the trial court properly granted the State’s Motion to Retain Jurisdiction pursuant to section 960.262(2), which permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for a period , of five years from release from supervision, which period commenced on November 20, 2012. Accordingly, we affirm the order under review. -

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. De La Paz, 388 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)
    …otal of 924 days prior to his transfer to a DOC facility. § 960.292(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 960.292(2)’s plain language tells us that a civil restitution lien is not required to be imposed at the time of sentencing. See Nickerson v. State, 178 So. 3d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (explaining that section 960.292(2) “permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for a period of five years from release from supervision”). Defendant concedes that DOC’s motion was filed within t…
  • State v. Sandomeno, 217 So. 3d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
    …over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later.” Id.; see also Nickerson v. State, 178 So. 3d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (explaining that section 960.292(2) “permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for a period of five years from release from supervision”). We therefore reverse and remand for a restitution hear…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw