JOSHUA JACKSON GRIMES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joshua Jackson Grimes was convicted of second-degree arson for a fire that a third party accidentally set in a car he had stolen. The court reversed his arson conviction, holding that because Grimes did not start the fire and had reached a place of temporary safety before the fire occurred, he could not be said to have caused the fire or for it to have occurred during the theft.
Grimes's second-degree arson conviction should be reversed because the state conceded he did not start the fire, and the fire occurred after he had reached a place of temporary safety, meaning he could not have caused the fire nor could the fire be said to have occurred during the commission of the theft.
[1] A conviction for second-degree arson requires proof that the defendant caused the fire.
[2] A defendant cannot be convicted of second-degree arson if the fire was accidentally set by a third party after the defendant had reached a place of temporary safety from…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the first element of second-degree arson requires proof that the defendant "caused" the fire”
Establishes the essential element of arson that the state must prove
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrimes took a car without the owner's permission after being denied permission to drive it again. A juvenile (H.L.) who was not present when the car w…
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Joshua Jackson Grimes stands convicted of second-degree arson for a fire a third party set accidentally in a car Mr. Grimes took after its owner denied him permission to drive it again. On appeal, he does not challenge his convictions for burglary, pet-it theft, and grand theft of the car. His argument on appeal (echoing his motion for judgment of acquittal) that he “did not start the fire, nor ha[ve] anything to do with the fire happening,” acknowledged and addressed by the state, is well taken. It is also broad enough to encompass a contention that the fire did not occur in the commission of the theft; Mr. Grimes’s ar*588son conviction should be reversed on that ground, too.
As the jury instruction makes clear, the first element of second-degree arson requires proof that the defendant “caused” the fire. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 12.2. Under the rule of lenity, the 1990 amendment to section 806.01, Florida Statutes, mei’ely relieves the state of the burden of proving that a person who causes a fire “while in the commission of any felony” did so intentionally. § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2014).
The state concedes Mr. Grimes did not start the fire. H.L., a juvenile who was not present when the car was taken from where its owner left it, accidentally set the interior of the ear on fire well after the appellant had taken the car and reached “a place of temporary safety.” State v. Williams, 776 So.2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (affirming judgment of acquittal on felony murder charge where defendant, after committing grand theft auto, had reached a place of temporary safety before causing the fatal car crash). Cf. Parker v. State, 570 So.2d 1048, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (affirming felony murder conviction where “[t]he time from the robbery to the killing was no longer than an hour, the killing occurred no more than several miles from the robbery, and the only stops that the robbers made were ... all to accomplish their goal of fleeing from the scene of the crime to a place of safety”). On these facts, it cannot be said that appellant caused the fire, nor that the fire occurred during the theft of the motor vehicle.
Reversed, and remanded for resentenc-ing.
LEWIS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Parker v. State, 570 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- State v. Williams, 776 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)