DAVID LEE KIDWELL, PETITIONER,
v.
DESIREE MOLINA KIDWELL, RESPONDENT
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David Lee Kidwell sought a writ of prohibition to challenge a final judgment dissolving his marriage and addressing child support and parental responsibility, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the child under Florida's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The appellate court denied the petition because prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only to prevent future judicial action, not to undo judgments already entered, and because the petition was untimely filed.
The writ of prohibition is not available to challenge a final judgment already entered, as the remedy is preventive and prospective in nature, not corrective or retrospective. Additionally, the petition cannot be treated as an appeal because it was filed ninety-one days after the final judgment, far exceeding the thirty-day jurisdictional window for appeals of final judgments.
[1] A writ of prohibition is a preventive remedy, not a corrective one, and cannot be used to revoke an order already entered.
[2] A petition for a writ of prohibition is not timely filed when the challenged judgment was entered before the petition was filed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The writ of prohibition "is preventive and not corrective_ Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke an order already entered."”
Establishes the fundamental nature and limitations of the writ of prohibition remedy, explaining why it cannot be used to challenge an already-entered final judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court issued a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with a Minor Child on June 15, 2015, adjudicating issues of child support and paren…
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Petitioner David Lee Kidwell seeks a writ of prohibition, essentially challenging a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with a Minor Child that adjudicated issues of child support and parental responsibility. Kidwell asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the couple’s child, pursuant to the Florida Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Fla. Stat. § 61.501-61.542 (2014). We deny the petition.
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the issuance of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary measure and ought to be used only in very narrow circumstances. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977). The writ of prohibition “is preventive and not corrective_ Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke an order already entered.” Id. at 296-97. See also State ex rel. Harris v. McCauley, 297 So.2d 825 (Fla.1974); State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So.2d 169 (Fla.1959).
In this case, the challenged final judgment was entered by the trial court before Kidwell filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Thus, irrespective of any merit to Kidwell’s petition, prohibition is not an available avenue to a remedy.
Additionally, we are without jurisdiction to treat the petition as an appeal under rule 9.040(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court issued the final judgment on June 15, 2015. Kidwell filed the petition for a writ of prohibition on September 9, 2015, well beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional window for an appeal of a final judgment. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Thus, we cannot review Kid-well’s petition as an appeal.
Although pro se litigants are often given leniency on certain procedural technicalities in how they draft motions or request relief, they are still subject to the rules of procedure. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). “Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of procedure.” Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Petition denied.
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Arleen Hanna-Mack v. Bank OF Am., N.A., 218 So. 3d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…Suarez v. Orta, 176 So. 3d 327, 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Florida courts emphasize substance over form. Id. Pro se litigants are also afforded leniency on certain procedural technicalities in drafting motions and requesting relief. Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). This leniency promotes the courts’ fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants “procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens,” id. although pro se litigants are still subje…
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Hanna v. Hemelberg, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)…the courts’ fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants ‘procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens,’ although pro se litigants are still subject to procedural rules.” (quoting Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted))). Without expressing any opinion on either the Dismissal Order or Hanna’s Vacatur Motion, we reverse the challenged order and remand for the trial court to adjudicate the Vacatur Motion. The rendition of…
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Aliner J. Harris v. Hga-Land Holdings, LLC (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)…); Butler v. Metropolitan Dade County, 298 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (affirming final summary judgment because material portions of record upon which trial court based its findings were omitted on appeal); see also Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of 3 p…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1972)
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Arthur Falkner v. Honorable John R. Blanton, 297 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1974)
- Barrett v. City OF Margate, 743 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- State of Fla. ex rel. R. C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1959)