DANIEL LENZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to cross-examine the appellant about the victim's motive to lie and by admitting recordings of the appellant's jailhouse phone calls discussing defense counsel.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by allowing cross-examination concerning a victim's motive to lie when the defendant has not attacked the victim's credibility on dire…
[2] A defendant's jailhouse telephone conversations with his wife discussing the selection of potential defense counsel are protected by the Sixth Amendment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of lewd and lascivious molestation. During trial, the court allowed the State to question him about whether the victim had a m…
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Daniel Lenz (hereinafter “Appellant”) appeals his conviction and sentence for two counts of lewd and lascivious molestation of a victim under the age of twelve. This appeal presents two issues for consideration: whether the trial court abused its discretion in (1) overruling Appellant’s relevance and unfair-prejudice objections to the State’s cross-examination of him concerning whether the victim had motive to lie; and (2) allowing the jury to hear recordings of Appellant’s telephone conversations with his wife during which he discussed selection of potential defense counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse on both issues.
In 2013, the then eleven-year-old victim confided in her mother that Appellant, her step-grandfather, had touched her inappropriately when she was younger, the touching having begun in 2007 when the victim stayed with Appellant in his home after school. The victim’s mother went to law enforcement leading to an investigation during which Appellant admitted to tickling and squeezing the victim on her legs, and further admitted he might, unintentionally, have “gotten a little high a couple of times,” meaning around her vagina. During the investigation, Appellant admitted touching the victim over her clothes only. Also during the investigation, one of the officers told Appellant that they did not think the victim was “a liar,” and Appellant agreed. While Appellant was in jail awaiting trial, he conversed with his wife by telephone and the calls were recorded. During those calls, Appellant told his wife that he would rather not be represented by a public defender and expressed interest in hiring a private lawyer whom Appellant opined knew “all the loopholes” as the lawyer was a former prosecutor. During the trial, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections to the State’s questions of him on cross-examination inquiring whether Appellant thought the victim had motive to lie. The trial court also overruled Appellant’s objection to the State’s playing for the jury the recordings of the jailhouse telephone conversations.
The abuse of discretion standard is applicable for review of a trial court’s decisions regarding the scope and control of cross-examination. Carlisle v. State, 137 So.3d 479, 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
*1241Here, the trial court incorrectly determined that Appellant had “opened the door” concerning issues of the victim’s credibility. In his direct testimony, Appellant repeatedly admitted that he touched the victim several times near or on her vagina. He qualified that admission by saying, in essence, that he never intended his touching to be pruriently or in any way sexually motivated, thereby leaving for the jury only the question of whether the touching constituted lewd and lascivious behavior.1 Furthermore, the record clearly demonstrates that on direct examination Appellant did not attack or otherwise call into question the victim’s credibility. “In order to open the door, the witness must offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual assertion which the opposing party has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled.” Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Cullen v. State, 920 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). It was the State’s questions of Appellant during cross examination — not anything Appellant said during his testimony on direct — which broached the subject of the victim’s credibility. Thus, the trial court erred in finding that Appellant opened the door for the State’s cross-examination questions which sought to elicit both irrelevant and prejudicial responses concerning the victim’s credibility.2
The trial court also erred by allowing the jury to hear audio recordings of jailhouse telephone conversations between Appellant and his wife during which they discussed his options regarding retaining counsel to represent him in the criminal matter. See Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla.2003) (“A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).
In Martinez v. State, 125 So.3d 985, 989-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), this Court referred to the unyielding foundation the framers of our Constitution laid protecting the selection of legal counsel in criminal proceedings. The exchanges between Appellant and his wife concerning their potential hiring of identified criminal defense lawyers was, unquestionably, protected by the Sixth Amendment. This is true regardless of the fact that Appellant, during one of the conversations, voiced his perception that one of the lawyers “knew all of the loopholes.”3
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Lenz v. State, 245 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…l phone calls where the defendant and his wife discussed retaining an attorney, which we held to be a clearly improper attempt to focus the jury on another impermissible factor: the defendant’s exercise of his right to counsel.2 See Lenz v. State, 183 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 1 Even though the prosecutor had earlier made similar improper arguments without objection, those arguments do not render the challenged argument harmless. Rather, the unobjected to improper argument bolsters the defenda…
Authorities Cited
- Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003)
- Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2005)
- Aills v. Luciano Boemi, M.D., 29 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 2010)
- Siegel v. State, 68 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
- Green v. State, 711 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Carlisle v. State, 137 So. 3d 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
- Cullen v. State, 920 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Golf Strategies, LLC, 125 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- Abel Martinez v. State, 125 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
- Green v. State, 132 So. 3d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)