SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, A STATE AGENCY OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, AS ASSIGNEE OF JOHN MALVIN, APPELLEE
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The School Board of Broward County appealed a trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds in a personal injury action arising from a motorcycle accident involving a school bus. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that the City of Coral Springs provided adequate statutory notice of the claim to satisfy section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes, and that the School Board was not entitled to sovereign immunity as a matter of law.
The School Board is not entitled to summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds. The City provided sufficient notice under section 768.28(6) by informing the School Board and the Department of Financial Services of the accident, its time and location, the injuries suffered, and that a claim was being made.
[1] A notice of a claim against a governmental entity is sufficient if it provides adequate information to put the entity on notice of the accident, its time, location, the i…
[2] The form and content of a presuit notice for a claim against a governmental entity are not specified in the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The notice requirement is intended to give the State and its agencies adequate notice of claims filed against them and to provide them with time to investigate and respond.”
Establishes the purpose of the statutory notice requirement under section 768.28(6)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice officer John Malvin, employed by the City of Coral Springs, was operating a motorcycle in August 2011 when he had an accident with a school bus…
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The School Board of Broward County (School Board) appeals a trial court order which denied its motion for summary judgment, determining as a matter of law that it is not entitled to sovereign immunity. This portion of the non-final order is appealable. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi).1 As to that ruling, we affirm.
John Malvin (Malvin) is a police officer employed by the City of Coral Springs (City). He was operating a motorcycle in the course of his employment in August 2011 when he had an accident involving a school bus owned by the School Board. The City paid him worker’s compensation benefits, and he assigned his claims to the City. The assignment provided that the City would recover from any judgment or settlement with the School Board and other defendants as reimbursement for worker’s compensation benefits previously paid to Malvin. Once reimbursement was satisfied, any remaining judgment or settlement would inure to Malvin. In exchange for the assignment, the City and worker’s compensation carrier agreed to sue the School Board and the individual defendant on Malvin’s behalf. Malvin was to be indemnified from any liability, cost or expense arising from the lawsuit.
In May 2014, the City, as assignee of Malvin, sited the School Board and sent a letter to the School Board and the Florida Department of Financial Services advising them of the personal injury claim they brought “as subrogee of John Malvin.” The School Board argued in defense that the action was barred by sovereign immunity and, alternatively, failure to comply with the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2011) for waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions. It filed a motion for final summary judgment on these and other issues.
No factual issues were in dispute. The trial court’s order denying summary judgment turned exclusively on questions of law. Review is de novo. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001); Eco-Tradition, LLC v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 137 So.3d 495, 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
We reject the School Board’s challenge to the sufficiency of the notice the City provided pursuant to section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (2011). This is the only sovereign immunity issue the *289School Board has raised in its iiiitial brief. The notice requirement is intended to give the State and its agencies adequate notice of claims filed against them and to provide them with time to investigate and respond. Aitcheson v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 117 So.3d 854, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing Cunningham v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 782 So.2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Reyes, 688 So.2d 311 (Fla.1996))). While notice is statutorily required, its form and content are not specified in the statute. Aitcheson, 117 So.3d at 856 (citing LaRiviere v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So.2d 972, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). The trial court did not err in concluding that the City provided sufficient information to the School Board and the Florida Department of Financial Services to put them on notice of the accident, its time, location, the injuries suffered and that a claim was being made.
Affirmed.
CIKLIN, C.J., TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Loran Leroy Smith, 203 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…und for which a party may appeal. While other portions of the order did concern venue and were appealable, jurisdiction does not extend to this portion of the order on bifurcation and severance. See Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. v. City of Coral Springs, 187 So. 3d 287, 288 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Certiorari does not lie because Hartford has not demonstrated irreparable harm caused by the denial of severance or bifurcation. See Smithers v. Smithers, 743 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (dismissing petition f…
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Mendez v. Alvarez, 390 So. 3d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)…d on the statute of limitations and failure to state a claim. These grounds are beyond the scope of this Court’s interlocutory review, and we are therefore without jurisdiction to address them. See Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. City of Coral Springs, 187 So. 3d 287, 288 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (addressing sovereign immunity but not assignability and timeliness because “[t]hey are not independently appealable under any of the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, and the appellate courts are…
Authorities Cited
- Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2001)
- RD & G Leasing, Inc. v. Stebnicki, 626 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Reyes, 688 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1996)
- Eco-Tradition, LLC v. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co., 137 So. 3d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
- Cunningham v. Fla. Dep't OF Child. & Families, 782 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- LaRIVIERE v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Josiane Swartz v. Citimortgage, Inc., 97 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)
- Aitcheson v. Fla. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 117 So. 3d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)