JEREMY JAMES ODOM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2016-03-08
No. 1D15-2107
. ETHERELL, RAY,, and KELSEY, JJ„ concur.
187 So. 3d 324 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2016) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jeremy Odom appealed his conviction for burglary and grand theft, challenging the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and the imposition of certain costs and fees. The court affirmed the denial of the acquittal motion but reversed and remanded regarding the discretionary fine, surcharge, and public defender lien due to procedural defects in their imposition.


Holding

The court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal but reversed the imposition of the discretionary fine and surcharge because they were not specifically pronounced at sentencing. The court also reversed the public defender lien exceeding the statutory minimum because the defendant was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before its imposition.


Headnotes

[1] A discretionary fine and surcharge imposed by a trial court must be orally pronounced at sentencing to provide adequate notice to the defendant.

[2] A trial court must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing a public defender lien and application fee in excess of the minimum statutory amounts.

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Key Quotes

“the fine authorized by section 775.083 is a discretionary fine which must be specifically pronounced at the sentencing hearing”

Establishes the legal requirement that discretionary fines must be explicitly pronounced, not merely implied through general cost pronouncements

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Facts & Procedural History

Odom was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. At sentencing, the trial court imposed mandatory costs and stated it would impose a $300…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal of a judgment and sentence for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft, Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and the imposition of a discretionary fine and surcharge as well as the imposition of a $300 public defender lien. We affirm without discussion the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal. The state correctly concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the discretionary fine and related surcharge and the public defender lien. Accordingly, we reverse these discretionary costs and remand for further proceedings.

In addition to the mandatory costs, the written judgment reflected a discretionary cost of $342.86 pursuant to section 775.083 and a surcharge of $17.14 pursuant to section 938.04. However, at sentencing, the trial court merely pronounced: “Court cost is 775, a hundred dollar Local Government Trust, a hundred cost of prosecution and $300 PD fee will be reduced to a judgment.” Contrary to the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, this pronouncement was insufficient to notify Appellant that such a fine and surcharge would be imposed. This court has held repeatedly that the fine authorized by section 775.083 is a discretionary fine which must be specifically pronounced at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Nix v. State, 84 So.3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The trial court may reimpose the discretionary fine and surcharge on remand after giving Appellant notice and following the proper procedure. See, e.g., id.; Oliver v. State, 75 So.3d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

The trial court further erred in failing to provide Appellant an opportunity to contest the imposition of the public defender lien and application fee in excess of the minimum statutory amount. Pursuant to sections 938.29(l)(a) and 27.52, the Legislature has required the imposition of a minimum fee of $100 for the assistance of the public defender’s office and a $50 application fee. A notice and hearing are not required before imposition of this minimum lien amount. Mills v. State, 177 So.3d 984, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (en banc). However, because the trial court did not impose' the minimum here, it was required to give Appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposition. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to reduce the public defender lien to the minimum amount or to hold a hearing with proper notice to Appellant. See Maestas *326 v. State, 76 So.3d 991, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holding that $400 public defender lien was erroneously imposed and remanding for imposition of minimum lien amount or a hearing with proper notice).

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with directions.

. ETHERELL, RAY,, and KELSEY, JJ„ concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Geraldo Alexis v. State, 211 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
    …harged misdemeanor or criminal traffic violation and $100 per case for a charged felony apply. § 938.29(l)(a). Because these fees are statutorily mandated, notice and a hearing are not required before imposition of the minimum amount. Odom v. State, 187 So. 3d 324, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). The preliminary notification of the possibility of a lien must however, be made at the time of the public defender’s appointment pursuant to rule 3.111(b)(5)(A). As occurred in the instant case, the trial court may exercis…
  • Darrin Lee Carmichael v. State, 192 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    …ny case); § 27.52(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014) (mandating a $50 application fee); § 775.083(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (authorizing the imposition of fines); § 938.04, Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing for a court cost of a five-percent surcharge); Odom v. State, 187 So. 3d 324, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (explaining that “[p]ursuant to sections [*641] 938.29(1)(a) and 27.52, the Legislature has required the imposition of a minimum fee of $100 for- the assistance of the public defender’s office and a $50 application fee. A no…
  • L. E. S. v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
    …, 211 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that because the minimum public defender fee of $100 for each felony case is mandated by statute, "notice and a hearing are not required before imposition of the minimum amount" (citing Odom v. State, 187 So. 3d 324, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016))); Mills v. State, 177 So. 3d 984, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (en banc) (holding that notice and a hearing are not necessary before the imposition of the minimum public defender fee mandated by section 938.29(1)(a) for felony…

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