KENNETH ARTHUR WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Arthur Wilson appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and robbery while armed, arguing that his confession was involuntary because he was coerced into accompanying officers to the sheriff's office. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions, finding that the trial judge's credibility determinations regarding the voluntariness of Wilson's accompaniment and confession were supported by competent, substantial evidence and distinguishable from a recent probationer consent case.
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the voluntary nature of Wilson's accompaniment and confession were supported by competent, substantial evidence and entitled to deference on appeal. The court distinguished the case from Villanueva v. State, where an officer failed to correct a probationer's misunderstanding about consent, finding that here the trial judge weighed conflicting evidence and made credibility determinations in favor of the officers.
[1] Appellate courts defer to a trial court's findings of fact when those findings are based on competent, substantial evidence.
[2] A trial judge's superior vantage point in assessing witness demeanor and credibility is a key factor in appellate deference to factual findings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When ruling on a motion to suppress, it is the responsibility of the trial judge, not the jury, to resolve issues of fact.”
Establishes that the trial judge, not the appellate court, has the authority and responsibility to determine factual disputes in suppression hearings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilson, who was on probation for another offense, was questioned by law enforcement officers regarding a murder. There was conflicting testimony about…
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ON MOTON FOR WRITTEN OPINION
Following our per curiam affirmance of Appellant’s convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and robbery while armed with a firearm, Appellant,.Kenneth Arthur Wilson, filed a, motion pursuant to rule 9.330(a), Florida Rules of Appellant Procedure, requesting a written opinion. We grant the motion, withdraw our previous per curiam affirmance, and substitute the following opinion which also affirms.
Appellant raised two issues' in his appeal. Iri his motion for written opinion he raises only the issue that our affir-mance conflicts with Villanueva v. State, 189 So.3d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), which found that a probationer’s consent to a warrantless search following a traffic stop was not voluntarily given. However, we find Villanueva distinguishable.
In Villanueva the facts were undisputed. Id: at 984. There, the officer testified that Villanueva consented to search because he believed he had no choice since he was on probation, and that'misunderstanding by Villanueva was not corrected by the officer. Id. In contrast, here the trial judge had conflicting evidence as to whether the Appellant, who was on probation for another offense, was told he had to accompany law enforcement officers to the Sheriffs office for questioning regarding a murder. The trial judge weighed the evidence and found based on their “demeanor and experience” that “the testimony given by these officers at the .suppression hearing [was] more credible than that of the Defendant and his mother.”
It is well-established “[w]hen ruling on a motion to suppress, it is the responsibility of the trial judge, not the jury, to resolve issues of fact.”. Jerido v. State, 15 So.3d 851, 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). As the Florida Supreme Court has stated:
We recognize and- honor the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making ‘ findings of fact. Thé deference that appellate courts afford findings of fact based - on competent, substantial evidence is an important principle of appellate review. In many instances, the trial court is in a superior position “to evaluate and'weigh the- testimony and evidence based upon its observation of the ^bearing, demeanor, and credibility of the witnesses.” Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976). When sitting as the trier of fact, the trial judge has the “superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses and judge their credibility.” Guzman v. State, 721 So.2d 1155, 1159 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. *5391102, 119 S.Ct. 1583, 143 L.Ed.2d 677 (1999). Appellate courts do not have this same opportunity,
Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1034 (Fla.1999).
The trial judge resolved the factual dispute in finding that the Appellant voluntarily accompanied the officers. The trial judge considered the voluntariness of the confession.1 The trial judge then found that the State met its burden and that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s confession showed that it was freely and voluntarily given.' See Martin v. State, 107 So.3d 281, 298 (Fla.2012); State v. Mallory, 670 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
AFFIRMED.
WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., concur.
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In re Vs (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)…nted to the circuit court . . . .”). The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential, and its application honors the superior vantage point of the trial court in assessing the demeanor and credibility of witnesses. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 191 So. 3d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (quoting Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999)). Consequently, the order must be affirmed unless “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court.” Treloar v. Smith, 791 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla.…
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Wilson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Duval County) (M.D. Fla. 2023)…e found, that once at the Sheriff’s office the Appellant was read “his Constitutional rights line by line and that [Appellant] acknowledged that he understood his rights before making his confession.” Resp. Ex. H; see also Wilson v. State, 191 So. 3d 537, 538-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Because the First DCA issued a written opinion, Petitioner could have sought discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court within thirty days of the date the First DCA rendered the opinion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.12…
Authorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1999)
- Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1998)
- Martin v. State, 107 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 2012)
- State v. Lebaron Mallory, 670 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Jimenez Castilleja v. Johnson, 526 U.S. 1102 (U.S. 1999)
- Villanueva v. State, 189 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
- Taurus Lejuane Jerido v. State, 15 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)