ARMANDO VIRUET, APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH G. GRACE, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order requiring the former husband to pay $100 per month toward child support arrearage because the record did not specify the amount of retroactive child support owed. The court remanded for the trial court to determine the retroactive child support amount and denied the appellant's other arguments regarding new trial and rehearing.
The court reversed the arrearage child support payment order because neither the magistrate's report nor the final judgment specified the amount of retroactive child support owed, requiring remand for the trial court to determine the retroactive amount. The court affirmed the denial of the motions for new trial and rehearing without prejudice to allow the appellant to raise the daycare cost issue before the trial court in the future.
[1] A court must specify the amount of retroactive child support owed in its final judgment.
[2] A trial court must determine the amount of retroactive child support, if any, owed before entering an amended final judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse the portion of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ordered former husband, Armando Viruet ('Appellant'), to pay $100 per month toward arrearage in child support because neither the magistrate's report, which the trial court approved, nor the final judgment, states the amount of the retroactive child support Appellant owes.”
Establishes the core holding that retroactive child support orders must specify the exact amount owed to be enforceable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArmando Viruet and Sarah G. Grace were parties to a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court approved a magistrate's report ordering Viruet…
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ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
We grant Appellant’s motion for clarification in part, deny it in part, and substitute the following opinion in place of the original.
We reverse the portion of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ordered former husband, Armando Viruet (“Appellant”), to pay $100 per month toward arrearage in child support because neither the magistrate’s report, which the trial court approved, nor the final judgment, states the amount of the retroactive child support Appellant owes. We remand for the trial court to determine the amount of retroactive child support, if.any, that Appellant owes and to enter an appropriate amended final judgment specifying the amount. Boyd v. Boyd, 168 So.3d 302, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); see also § 61.30(17), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“In an initial determination of child support, ... the court has discretion to award child support retroactive to the date when the parties did not reside together in the same household with the child....”).
*644Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for new trial and for rehearing. In his motions, Appellant argued that he should have been afforded an opportunity to present evidence to establish that, due, to the daycare facility used by the parties requiring him to prepay for the entire week, Appellant was paying all of the daycare costs, rather than only his proportional share as ordered in the final judgment.. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motions, but we do so without prejudice to permit Appellant to bring the matter before the trial court should he choose to assert that Sarah G. Grace, former wife and Appellee,' has not paid 'her court-ordered proportional share of daycare expenses.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
SAWAYA, TORPY and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.