CITIBANK, N.A., NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES I TRUST 2006-HE3, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-HE3, APPELLANT,
v.
UNKNOWN HEIRS, BENEFICIARIES, DEVISEES, ASSIGNEES, LIENORS, CREDITORS, TRUSTEES AND ALL OTHERS WHO MAY CLAIM AN INTEREST IN THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH E. JAMES; UNKNOWN TENANT(S), APPELLEES
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Citibank appeals the denial of its motion to vacate a foreclosure summary judgment, dismiss the complaint, and dissolve a lis pendens. The court reversed, holding that the judgment was void because it was entered during the automatic stay imposed by the debtor's bankruptcy filing, and therefore the motion to vacate should have been granted.
The foreclosure judgment was void because it was entered during the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 following the debtor's bankruptcy filing. The trial court had no discretion to deny the motion to vacate, and upon vacation of the judgment, the trial court was required to allow dismissal of the action and dissolve the lis pendens.
[1] A judgment entered in violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. …
[2] A trial court has no discretion to deny a motion to vacate a void judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the record of the trial court proceedings demonstrates that the judgment at issue was entered the day after the defendant/debtor's petition for bankruptcy was filed in federal court, the judgment was entered during the pen-dency of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. The judgment was therefore void.”
Establishes the core holding that a judgment entered during the automatic stay is void regardless of notice to the parties or court.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCitibank, as trustee for a mortgage-backed securities trust, obtained a summary judgment of foreclosure against the estate of Joseph E. James. The jud…
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Appellant appeals from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to vacate the summary judgment of foreclosure, to dismiss the complaint, and to dissolve the lis pendens. Appellant’s motion was filed in the trial court pursuant to section 702.07, Florida Statutes (2015), and rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The order denying the motion to vacate is an appealable final order under rule 9.130(5), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Because the record of the trial court proceedings demonstrates that the judgment at issue was entered the day after the defendant/debtor’s petition for bankruptcy was filed in federal court, the judgment was entered during the pen-dency of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. The judgment was therefore void. See McMahon v. Ryan, 964 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). This is so, even though Appellant and the trial court did not have notice of the automatic stay until after the judgment was entered. Personalized Air Conditioning, Inc. v. C.M. Sys. of Pinellas Cty., Inc., 522 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Woods v. Lloyds Asset Mgmt., LLC, 191 So.3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). The trial court had no discretion to deny the motion to vacate a void judgment. Segalis v. Roof Depot USA LLC, 178 So.3d 83, 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
With the void judgment vacated, the trial court should also have allowed dismissal of the action. Rule 1.420(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without order of the trial court. “The trial court has no authority or discretion to deny the voluntary dismissal.” Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So.3d 23, 31 (Fla.2013).
Finally, with the action dismissed, the trial court should have dissolved the lis pendens. “[W]hen the action no longer affects the subject property, the court shall control and discharge the recorded notice of lis pendens as the court would grant and dissolve injunctions.” § 48.23(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). The action in which the lis pendens was filed will no longer affect the subject property after the action is dismissed. Therefore the lis pendens should have been dissolved.
Accordingly, the order denying the motion to vacate the summary final judgment in foreclosure, dismiss the complaint, and dissolve the lis pendens is REVERSED and this cause REMANDED for entry of an order granting the motion.
LEWIS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
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- Pino v. The Bank OF NEW York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013)
- Personalized AIR Conditioning, Inc. v. C.M. Sys. OF Pinellas Cnty., Inc., 522 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Yakov Segalis v. Roof Depot USA, LLC, 178 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
- McMAHON v. Janice M.A. Ryan, 964 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Woods v. Lloyds Asset Mgmt., LLC, 191 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)