CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,

v.

KARL E. ENGEL, AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, SERGEANT ROBERT LANDIS, AS POLICE OFFICER OF SAID CITY IN CHARGE OF THE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, LIEUTENANT WAYNE THURMAN, AS POLICE OFFICER OF THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI IN CHARGE OF THE DETECTIVE AND HOMICIDE BUREAU, SERGEANT LEE GRAHAM, AS POLICE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE JUVENILE BUREAU, HARRY WHITE, AS SUPERVISOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS BUREAU, AND MARGARET CROSSON, AS TRAFFIC CROSSING GUARD AND AS A MEMBER OF THE SCHOOL PATROL, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1959-02-03

Nos. 58-773, 774, 775, 776

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.

111 So. 2d 90 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1959) Positive Treatment

Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

This case involves an appeal from a directed verdict for a landlord after a minor tenant fell through a defective window screen.

Holding

A landlord is not liable for personal injuries sustained by a tenant falling through a defective screen in the absence of a special agreement to repair the demised premises.

Facts & Procedural History

A minor child, a tenant's daughter, was injured when she fell through a defective screen in an apartment leased from the defendant. There was no writt…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Topics

Municipal Corporations Supersedeas Interlocutory Appeal

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a municipal corporation, has moved this court for an order superseding certain orders of the Circuit Court from which appeals have been taken. Application was made by the appellant to the trial court for an order superseding the orders appealed and this was denied.

The question involved here is the application or non-application of § 59.14(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., to interlocutory appeals from orders in chancery by a municipal corporation. We conclude that the statute is applicable upon the rule announced in City of Miami v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 70. Although the appeal in City of Miami v. Lewis, supra, was from a final judgment at law, whereas the cases at bar are interlocutory appeals from orders in chancery, this distinction does not create such a difference as would preclude the application of the statutory provisions. Section 59.14(1), supra, provides:

“ * * * the filing of the notice of appeal shall perfect the same and stay the execution or performance of the judgment, decree, or order appealed from, and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the appellate court.” [Emphasis supplied.]

So, it can be seen the statute contemplates an appeal, without distinction as to the type of appeal, from judgments, decrees or orders. Inasmuch as interlocutory appeals are provided for under Rule 4.2, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., we conclude *91that the filing of a notice of interlocutory-appeal by a municipal corporation operates to stay the execution or performance of such orders.

Accordingly, the motions in these cases for supersedeas orders are denied because the filing of the city’s appeals operates as a stay of the orders appealed from without the necessity of stay orders.

It is so ordered.

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

City OF N. Miami v. Engel, 109 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)

…nction order to maintain the status quo, pending-determination of the mandamus action which was then before another judge of that court. When the city, after appealing from the injunction order, moved in this court for a supersedeas order, we held (111 So. 2d 90) that the city’s appeal operated as a stay without the necessity for such an order, by virtue of § 59.14(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. See City of Miami v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 70. Thereafter, on motion of the appellees this court granted an inju…
Reeves v. State, 187 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)

…f the following reasons: (1) The effect of the circuit court order holding the ordinance unconstitutional was stayed by the City taking the appeal [see: City of Miami v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 70; City of North Miami v. Engel, Fla.App.1959, 111 So. 2d 90]; or (2) The provisions of § 856.02 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., or (3) The common law relative to vagrancy. The question of whether an arrest is valid so as to support an incidental search, is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined advisedly by t…
City OF Miami v. Cuban Vill-Age Co., Inc., 143 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)

…fter, the City took an appeal which, pursuant to the provisions of § 59.14, Fla.Stat, F.S.A., operated as an automatic stay of the decree appealed. See: City of Miami v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 70; City of North Miami v. Engel, Fla.App.1959, 111 So. 2d 90. It then appears from the record before us that the City, subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, is threatening to and will arrest the appellee for conducting its business without the necessary municipal licenses. This action on the part…

Authorities Cited

City OF Miami v. Blanche T. Lewis, 104 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)

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