EDWARD LEE BASKIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Edward Baskin appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary with a firearm, grand theft of a firearm, grand theft, and cannabis possession arising from a single criminal episode. The appellate court affirms his convictions but reverses and remands his sentences on the grand theft counts because they were improperly ordered to run consecutively to the burglary sentence under habitual felony offender enhancement, and remands to correct the written judgment on the burglary count to match the oral pronouncement.
The court affirms Baskin's convictions but reverses the sentences on the grand theft counts because consecutive sentences imposed under habitual felony offender enhancement for crimes committed in a single criminal episode violate precedent. The court remands for the sentences on the grand theft counts to be imposed concurrently, and remands the burglary count for the trial court to correct the written judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement of a thirty-year sentence as an HFO with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
[1] Minimum mandatory sentences for offenses arising from a single criminal episode must run concurrently, not consecutively, when both sentences are enhancements.
[2] The habitual offender statute and the firearm enhancement statute are both considered enhancement statutes for sentencing purposes.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find nothing in the language of the habitual offender statute which suggests that the legislature also intended that, once the sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode have been enhanced through the habitual offender statutes, the total penalty should then be further increased by ordering that the sentences run consecutively.”
Establishes the core legal principle that consecutive sentences under HFO enhancement for crimes in a single criminal episode are improper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBaskin was convicted following a jury trial of burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, grand theft of a firearm, grand theft of more than $100 but less…
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Edward Baskin challenges his convictions and sentences for burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, grand theft of a firearm, grand theft of more than $100 but *829less than $300, and possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis. All of the offenses arose from the same criminal episode. Mr. Baskin was convicted following a jury trial, and the trial court sentenced him as a habitual felony offender (HFO) to thirty years with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison releasee reoffender sentence for the burglary, five years as an HFO on each of the grand theft charges to be served concurrently to one another but consecutively to the burglary sentence, and time served on the possession charge.
We affirm his convictions without comment, but because Mr. Baskin’s HFO sentences on the grand theft convictions in counts two and three improperly run consecutively to the burglary sentence in count one, we must reverse his sentences in counts two and three and remand with instructions to run his sentences concurrently. See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 524 (Fla.1993) (“We find nothing in the language of the habitual offender statute which suggests that the legislature also intended that, once the sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode have been enhanced through the habitual offender statutes, the total penalty should then be further increased by ordering that the sentences run consecutively.”); see also Saldana v. State, 139 So.3d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“[T]he charges ... arose from the same criminal episode. Thus, the consecutive ... sentences for these crimes are illegal under Hale. Accordingly, we reverse Sal-dana’s sentences and remand with directions for the court to impose concurrent sentences.” (citations omitted)).
Additionally, at sentencing, on count one, the trial court orally sentenced Mr. Baskin to thirty years’ imprisonment as an HFO, with the first fifteen years being served as a mandatory minimum pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffen-der Act.' See § 775.082(9)(a)(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). The trial court’s written judgment states that for count one, Mr. Baskin is to be imprisoned for thirty years and notes that he “is declared a Prison Releasee Reoffender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(9)(a)(3).” But there is no mention of the HFO enhancement, and the PRR notation does not state that the mandatory minimum sentence under that enhancement is for fifteen years only. As such, the written sentence does not comport with the oral pronouncement. Therefore, on remand the trial court must also correct the written judgment as to count one to reflect its oral pronouncement. See Rivera v. State, 117 So.3d 449, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“Because the written sentences do not comport with the trial court’s oral pronouncement, we must remand for correction of the written sentences to reflect the oral pronouncement.”).1
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
ALTENBERND and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Alton Jamal Rivera v. State, 117 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- Eliseo Gonzales Saldana v. State, 139 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)