DYCK-O'NEAL, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
KEVIN MONIZ, APPELLEE
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Dyck-O'Neal appealed a trial court's dismissal of its deficiency judgment action against out-of-state defendant Moniz for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Fifth District reversed, holding that Florida's long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who owns real property in Florida when the cause of action arises from that ownership, regardless of whether the defendant still owns the property.
The trial court lacked authority to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Florida's long-arm statute requires only that the cause of action arise from a nonresident's ownership of real property in Florida; it does not require continuing ownership at the time of the deficiency action. Moniz should have reasonably anticipated being haled back to Florida to address the deficiency claim, as the foreclosure judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction.
[1] A Florida court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who owns real property in Florida, pursuant to the Florida long-arm statute.
[2] A cause of action for a deficiency judgment arises from a nonresident's ownership of real property in Florida for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The language of the statute merely requires that Appellant's cause of action arose from a nonresident's ownership of real property in Florida.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that the long-arm statute does not require continuing ownership, only that the cause of action arise from ownership.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKevin Moniz, a California resident, purchased Florida real property and obtained a loan secured by a mortgage on the property. When Moniz defaulted, t…
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Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., appeals the order dismissing with prejudice its amended complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Kevin Moniz. The trial court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Moniz, an out-of-state resident. We reverse.
The material facts in this case are not in dispute and are virtually identical to the facts in Dyckr-O’Neal, Inc. v. Rojas, 197 So.3d 1200, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1636, 2016 WL 3769012 (Fla. 5th DCA July 15, 2016). Mr. Moniz, a resident of California, purchased real property in Florida. To facilitate the purchase of the property, he obtained a loan and executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. When he defaulted on the note, the lender filed a foreclosure suit and obtained a final judgment of foreclosure that reserved jurisdiction over the parties to render a deficiency judgment, if appropriate. Subsequent to the foreclosure sale, the lender assigned the final judgment, including the right to seek a deficiency, to Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., which then filed a separate action to obtain a deficiency judgment against Mr. Moniz. After being served with a complaint, Mr. Moniz filed a motion to dismiss, contesting the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
Among other things, section 48.193(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2013), the Florida long-arm statute, allows a Florida court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident who owns, uses, 'possesses or holds a mortgage or other lien on any real property in this state. Mr. Moniz argued below, and on appeal, that this provision requires continuing ownership, use or possession of real property by a non-resident before Florida can acquire personal jurisdiction. In rejecting that same argument in Rojas, we held “[t]he language of the statute merely requires that Appellant’s cause of action arose from a nonresident’s ownership of real property in Florida.” See Rojas, 197 So.3d at 1202, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D1637, 2016 WL 3769012 at *2; see also Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 565, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). As we held in Rojas, and the First District held in Hwthsing, Mr. Moniz should -have reasonably anticipated being haled back to Florida to address a claim for a deficiency, as the foreclosure final judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction to do so.1
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.'