LESHANNON JEROME SHELLY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Leshannon Shelly appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a videotaped confession. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Shelly reinitiated contact with police after invoking his right to counsel, permitting continued interrogation under the Edwards rule.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The confession was admissible because Shelly himself reinitiated communication with officers after invoking his right to counsel, which under Edwards permits continued interrogation. The court also affirmed that the investigator's discussions about realistic penalties and encouraging truthfulness constituted a proper interrogation tactic.
[1] A confession is admissible when a suspect, after unequivocally invoking the right to counsel, reinitiates further communication with law enforcement.
[2] Discussions with a suspect regarding realistic penalties, including the death penalty, do not render a confession involuntary if the purpose is to encourage truthfulness.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When an accused has 'expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.'”
States the Edwards rule governing interrogation after invocation of right to counsel
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficers responded to reports of gunshots and found one victim dead and another critically injured. The next day, Shelly voluntarily went to jail to s…
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Leshannon Shelly appeals his judgment and sentence after the trial court denied his motion to suppress a videotaped confession and a jury found him guilty of first degree murder with a firearm and attempted first degree murder with a firearm. Shelly argues his confession should have been suppressed because (1) he invoked his right to an attorney and (2) his confession was involuntary based on. the investigator’s discussions with him regarding the death penalty. We affirm as to the second argument, without discussion, satisfied that the discussion was a proper interrogation tactic, “[mjerely informing a suspect of realistic penalties and encouraging him to tell -the truth.” See Nelson v. State, 688 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). We also affirm as to the first issue, for the reasons stated below.
Officers responded to reports of gunshots fired, and found one victim dead and the other critically injured. The next day, after hearing rumors of his involvement in the shootings, Shelly voluntarily went to the jail to speak to investigators. During the course of the interrogation, it is uncontested that Shelly unequivocally invoked his right to speak to an attorney. However, the record also reveals that Shelly continued the conversation with investigators, requesting, more than once, that the officers follow up on his alleged alibi by calling his mother.
“When an accused has ‘expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ ” Moss v. State, 60 So.3d 540, 542-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). In reviewing the record, we are satisfied that, given the totality of the circumstances and the statements made by Shelly, he was the one who reinitiated communications with the officers. Since he was the catalyst for further conversation, which eventually led to his confession, we affirm the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress the videotape.
Affirmed.
WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur.
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Leshannon Jerome Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018)…LAWSON, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that a citation in the Fourth District's three-paragraph decision in Shelly v. State , 199 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), expressly and directly conflicts with a sentence in Welch v. State , 992 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2008). It does not. Because we have no authority to decide this case, I dissent. The Florida Constitution grants this Court authority to…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981)
- Nelson v. State, 688 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Moss v. State, 60 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)