JOHN LEE PUGH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Lee Pugh appealed his conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm, raising four issues including ineffective assistance of counsel claims and a sentencing challenge. The appellate court affirmed the denial of ineffective assistance claims but reversed the sentencing because the trial court imposed a life sentence without articulating the statutory authority required under the 10-20-Life statute as clarified by the Florida Supreme Court in Hatten v. State.
The court affirmed the denial of ineffective assistance of counsel claims but reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to articulate the additional statutory authority required to impose a sentence beyond the mandatory minimum under the 10-20-Life statute, as clarified by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hatten v. State.
[1] A trial court's denial of ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised pursuant to rule 3.850 will be affirmed without further comment when no error is found.
[2] A sentencing error occurs when a trial court imposes a sentence beyond a mandatory minimum without articulating additional statutory authority.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the trial court chooses to impose a sentence beyond the selected mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute, additional statutory authority is required.”
Establishes the legal requirement that sentencing courts must articulate statutory authority when imposing sentences exceeding the mandatory minimum under 10-20-Life.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant John Lee Pugh was convicted of aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a firearm, among other charges. The aggravated battery cha…
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Appellant raises four issues on appeal. We affirm, without further comment, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims (Claims 1-3) raised pursuant to rule 3.850. With regard to Claim 4, we agree that a sentencing error has occurred. Appellant was convicted of aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a firearm, among other charges. The aggravated battery charge was reclassified to a first-degree felony, and at sentencing, Appellant received a life sentence with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory term. Appellant challenges this portion of his sentence. The trial court relied upon this Court’s opinion in Hatten v. State, 152 So.3d 849 *463(Fla. 1st DCA 2014), as authority for the sentencing decision. Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the opinion. In Hatten v. State, — So.3d -, 2016 WL 4493557, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S352 (Fla.2016), the supreme court declared that where the 10-20-Life statute is implicated, a sentencing judge may impose a mandatory minimum sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentence, “even if the selected mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum absent the 10-20-Life statute.” Id. at -, at *3. However, “if the trial court chooses to impose a sentence beyond the selected mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute, additional statutory authority is required.” Id. at -, at *4. Here, the trial court did not articulate any additional statutory authority for the life sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s conviction, but reverse and remand for resen-tencing consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Hatten.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing.
MAKAR, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ„ concur.