TIMOTHY HERSCHEL THOMAS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Timothy Herschel Thomas, Jr. was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, firearm discharge, and felony firearm possession. On appeal, the court reversed his sentences, holding that while the trial court erred in mandating consecutive PRR sentences and consecutive 10-20-Life mandatory minimums, it properly required consecutive sentencing for the qualifying offenses relative to the non-qualifying firearm discharge charge.
The trial court erred in mandating consecutive PRR sentences and consecutive 10-20-Life mandatory minimums, as such consecutive sentencing is permissible but not mandatory. However, the trial court properly required consecutive sentences for the qualifying offenses to the non-qualifying firearm discharge offense under the plain language of the 10-20-Life statute.
[1] A trial court has discretion to impose consecutive prison releasee reoffender sentences, but is not required to do so.
[2] Consecutive sentencing is permissible but not mandatory when a defendant commits multiple firearm offenses contemporaneously and shoots at multiple victims.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“consecutive sentencing is permissible but not mandatory when the defendant commits multiple firearm offenses contemporaneously and shoots at multiple victims”
Establishes that trial courts have discretion in imposing consecutive 10-20-Life mandatory minimums
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant shot a gun from his car at another vehicle with two occupants at a gas station. He was convicted of two counts of attempted second-degree mu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Written Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant was convicted of four offenses—two counts of attempted second-degree murder (counts 1 and 2), discharging a firearm from a vehicle (count 3), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count 4)—arising out of an incident at a gas station during which he shot a gun from his car at another car that had two occupants. Appellant was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to 30 years on count 1, with a 25-year mandatory minimum term under the 10-20-Life statute; 30 years on count 2, with a 20-year mandatory minimum term under the 10-20-Life statute; five years on count 3; and 10 years on count 4, with a 3-year mandatory minimum term.1 All of the sentences, and all of the mandatory minimum terms, were ordered to run consecutively.
On appeal, Appellant argues—and the State concedes—that the trial court erroneously concluded that (1) it was required to impose the PRR sentences in counts 1 and 2 consecutively, see State v. Mosley, 149 So.3d 684, 688 (Fla.2014) (explaining that trial court “may” impose consecutive PRR sentences); and (2) it was required to impose all of the mandatory minimum terms under the 10-20-Life statute consecutively, see Williams v. State, 186 So.3d 989, 993 (Fla.2016) (explaining that “consecutive sentencing is permissible but not mandatory” when the defendant commits multiple firearm offenses contemporaneously and shoots at multiple victims). However, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the trial court did not err in imposing the sentence for count 3 consecutively because the plain language of the 10-20-Life statute required the court to impose the sentences for the “qualifying” offenses in counts 1, 2, and 4, consecutively to the sentence for the “non-qualifying” offense in count 3. See Martin v. State, 190 So.3d 252, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (discussing section 775.087(2)(d), Florida Statutes).
Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s sentences and remand for resentencing in accordance with the above-cited cases. We affirm all of the other issues raised by Appellant without discussion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
LEWIS, WETHERELL, and JAY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Spatcher v. State, 228 So. 3d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…; Aponte, 896 So. 2d at 837-38. The State concedes that if the sentencing document reflected the actual sentence, we would have to reverse. But as the State argues, the. oral .pronouncement—not the sentencing document—controls. See Thomas v. State, 204 So. 3d 549, 550 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Busbee v. State, 187 So. 3d 1266, 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). At sentencing, the court said little about the driving case, but it clearly said the five years of probation was “to follow” the one year- of community control…
-
Morris v. State, 246 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…entencing hearing on the carjacking count. See State v. Mosley, 149 So. 3d 684, 688 (Fla. 2014) (holding that a trial court may impose consecutive PRR sentences on a defendant for crimes committing during a single criminal episode); Thomas v. State, 204 So. 3d 549, 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (same). ---PAGE 4--- 4 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing. B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and BILBREY, J., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorize…
Authorities Cited
- Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)
- Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2016)
- State v. Mosley, 149 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2014)
- Martin v. State, 190 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)