A.L.H., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A.L.H., a juvenile, appeals a disposition order withholding adjudication and placing him on probation for trespass of a stolen vehicle. The appellate court affirms, finding sufficient evidence that A.L.H. knowingly entered the vehicle without authorization, based on his spontaneous denial of knowing the car was stolen.
The court held that the State presented prima facie evidence of the willful element of trespass. A.L.H.'s spontaneous and unprompted admission that he did not know the car was stolen, made before the officer informed him it was stolen, could reasonably be construed as demonstrating his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen.
[1] A denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal is reviewed de novo.
[2] When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To establish the delinquent act of trespass of a conveyance, the State had to prove that A.L.H. "willfully entered or remained in a conveyance without being authorized, licensed or invited by the owner or a person authorized to give permission."”
Establishes the statutory elements required to prove trespass of a conveyance under Florida law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.L.H. was a passenger in a stolen vehicle recovered in Gulfport, Florida. Fingerprint evidence connected A.L.H. to the vehicle. During a police inter…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prima Facie Case cases and more on FLexlaw
A.L.H. appeals a disposition order that withheld adjudication and placed him on probation until his eighteenth birthday for trespass of a structure or conveyance. See § 810.08, Fla. Stat. (2014). We have jurisdiction, Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(B), and affirm.
A.L.H. was a passenger in a car determined to be stolen in Belleair, Florida. The vehicle was later recovered in Gulf-port, Florida. Fingerprint evidence connected A.L.H. to the vehicle. A Belleair police officer interviewed A.L.H., who admitted that he might have been in the car, but he did not remember. The officer showed A.L.H. pictures of the car and a Gulfport police report.1 He also told A.L.H. that his fingerprints were found on a car window. A.L.H. then admitted that he entered the car through the window, but claimed that he did not know the car was stolen. The officer testified that he did not tell A.L.H. that the car was stolen.
After the State presented its evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, A.L.H. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing that the State failed to present evidence to prove the elements of trespass. Specifically, A.L.H. claimed that the State failed to prove that he knew or should have known that the car was stolen. The trial court denied A.L.H.’s motion. The trial court reasoned that “[t]he circumstances presented to the Court, perhaps most tellingly, [A.L.H.’s] own implicatory statement indicate to the Court that beyond a reasonable doubt he is guilty of this offense.”
On appeal, A.L.H. contends that the State proved only that A.L.H. had been inside the car, but not that he knew the car was stolen.
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal. E.A.B. v. State, 851 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and if a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain the conviction.” Id.
To establish the delinquent act of trespass of a conveyance, the State had to prove that A.L.H. “willfully entered or remained in a conveyance without being authorized, licensed or invited by the owner or a person authorized to give permission.” A.H. v. State, 151 So.3d 48, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting R.M. v. State, 763 So.2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also § 810.08(1). In this context, the “willful” element requires the State to establish that A.L.H. knew or should have known that the vehicle was stolen. See A.H., 151 So.3d at 50.
A.L.H.’s spontaneous and apparently unprompted admission that he did not know that the car was stolen could reasonably be construed as demonstrating his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen because it was made before the officer informed him that the car was stolen. See, e.g., State v. Kirkwood, 229 N.C.App. 656, 747 S.E.2d 730, 735 (2013) (“[Djuring his police interview, defendant Kirkwood demonstrated knowledge of the shooting beyond what an uninvolved person would know by denying being in the part of town in which the shooting occurred before the interviewer ever told him where the shooting occurred.”). On that basis, we must *784conclude, based on the record before us, that the State presented prima facie evidence as to the “willful” element of trespass.
We feel compelled to observe, however, that the officer testified that he showed A.L.H. the Gulfport police report, together with pictures of the car, before A.L.H. asserted that he did not know the car was stolen. Conceivably, A.L.H. could have gleaned from the report that the car was stolen, thus prompting his comment that he did not know.
Unfortunately for A.L.H., the police report is not in our record and we must eschew speculation as to whát the report said and whether A.L.H. studied it. We are bound by the record and arguments made in the trial court. See Lynx Transp. v. Atkinson, 720 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Based on what is before us, we are compelled to affirm the rulings of the trial court.
Affirmed.
SLEET and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
T. A. K. v. State, 258 So. 3d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…using the vehicle if in fact using it a lawful way." The court denied the motion. Our review of the denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal is de novo, and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. A.L.H. v. State, 205 So. 3d 782, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). A judgment of dismissal is proper if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k); E.A.B. v. State, 851 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Sufficient evidence…
Authorities Cited
- Vidal Soto v. State, 851 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- R.M. v. State, 763 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Lynx Transp. v. Atkinson, 720 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- A.H. v. State, 151 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)