ESSIE C. MCKINNON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MAUDE C. BARNES, DECEASED, ET AL.,
v.
RELIANCE INSURANCE CO.
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An insurance company brought an interpleader suit to deposit insurance proceeds in court registry when two claimants—the estates of a husband and wife who died in a common disaster—both claimed the funds. The court affirmed an award of attorney's fees to the insurance company as a disinterested stakeholder, holding that such fees are proper in interpleader proceedings when the complainant has no interest in the outcome.
The court held that attorney's fees may properly be awarded to a disinterested stakeholder complainant in an interpleader proceeding, provided the complainant had no interest in the outcome, was not responsible for the controversy, and engaged in no fraud. The fee must be commensurate with services performed.
“The purpose of the statute as just enumerated was to direct the course and distribution of insurance on the death of the insured and to exempt it from attachment, garnishment, or other legal process in favor of creditors unless made for the benefit of such creditors. It has no application to a judgment of attorney's fees such as that involved in this litigation.”
Establishes that insurance protection statutes do not bar attorney's fees awards in interpleader proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOscar and Maude C. Barnes drowned together in Halifax River on December 25, 1930, with no evidence showing which survived the other. They held two ins…
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Oscar Barnes and his wife, Maude C. Barnes, perished in a common disaster by drowning in Halifax River, December 25, 1930. There is no way of knowing which one survived the other. They held two policies of insurance in the Reliance Insurance Company, appellee, aggregating Ten Thousand, Twenty-four, and Two *371One-hundredths Dollars ($10,024.02). The appellants both laid claim to this fund. The appellee deposited it in the registry of the court and filed its bill in equity praying that appellants be required to interplead for the purpose of determining to which of them the said funds belonged and should be paid. By agreement of attorneys for appellants an order of interpleader was entered. A decree distributing the fund was also entered by agreement of appellants over the objection of appellee. A decree awarding the complainant, appellee here, $500.00 as solicitor’s fees, to be paid from the fund deposited in the registry of the court, was' entered about the same time as the preceding decrees. The instant appeal is from the latter decree.
" The propriety of a decree awarding attorney’s fees to the complainant, insurance company, from the proceeds of Jnsurance for bringing an interpleader suit to determine adversary claims to the proceeds of said insurance in the registry of the court is the sole question brought here for adjudication. To support its contention that' such a fee should not be allowed appellant relies on Section 4977, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 7065, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Brown, et al., v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762.
The purpose of the statute as just enumerated was to direct the course and distribution of insurance on the death of the insured and to exempt it from attachment, garnishment, or other legal process in favor of creditors unless made for the benefit of such creditors. It has' no application to a judgment of attorney’s fees such as that involved in this litigation.
In Brown, et al., v. Marsh, supra, this Court pointed out the division of authority on the matter of the allowance of attorney’s' fees in interpleader proceedings but called *372attention to the fact that the weight of authority supported the affirmative of that issue, the fee to be commensurate with the service performed. In that case the attorney’s fees were refused because the complainant was directly interested in the outcome of the interpleader suit.
In the instant case the situation is quite different. The complainant is a disinterested stake holder. It was in no sense responsible for the controversy necessitating the interpleader suit, was free from fraud, and reaped no benefit whatever from the result of litigation. So far as the record discloses the parties required to interplead .were solely interested in the distribution of the, fund. Under such circumstances the judgment below awarding attorney’s fees to complainant was proper,and is affirmed. The reasonableness of the fee is not questioned.
Affirmed.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield and Buford, J. J., concur.
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The Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y OF the United States & Marjorie C. Walsh v. Nichols, 84 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1956)…terpleader, there can be no doubt that the circumstances here were such as would have entitled the insurance company to file a bill of interpleader in equity. See Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So. 2d 519; McKinnon v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 370, 151 So. 699; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bancroft, 122 Fla. 10, 164 So. 515. But it is equally true that a judicial decision in the suits filed against it by claimants would determine, once and for all, the proper disposition of the fund in its hands…
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Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1 (Fla. 1941)…emselves. The petitioner also contends that the court erred in allowing the complainant in interpleader reasonable attorney’s fees. We think that the facts in this case bring it clearly within the purview of McKinnon, et oil., v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 370, 151 Sou. 699, and that the court below in allowing the attorney’s fees followed our conclusions in that case. The order dismissing the complainant in the bill for interpleader was a final decree insofar as the insurance company was concerned but t…
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Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Witous, 411 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…d. A party who is entitled to sue in interpleader is ordinarily permitted to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees from the inter-pleaded fund. Miller v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So. 2d 519 (1941); McKinnon v. Reliance Insurance Co., 113 Fla. 370, 151 So. 699 (1933). However, in Ellison v. Riddle, 166 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), after referring to the rule of civil procedure on interpleader, this court said: Even though an interpleader action may be maintained under this rule, it do…
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- Brown v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253 (Fla. 1929)