MICHAEL CLAYTON WOODRUFF, APPELLANT,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

EMAS, J.

Michael Woodruff appeals from a conviction and sentence for one count of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim under twelve years of age, in violation of section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes (2009).1 Wood-ruff raises four issues on appeal: 1) The trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim was the product of a sexual battery; 2) The trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim had previously fabricated that she was pregnant; 3) The trial court erred in denying Woodruffs motion for a new trial predicated upon a post-trial interview of a juror; and 4) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

We find no merit in the first three issues raised by Woodruff, each of which is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747 (Fla. 2001) (holding that a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard); Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 156 (Fla. 1998) (holding that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion); State v. Prieto, 439 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial).

As to the evidentiary issues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence Woodruff sought to introduce at trial. Any purported probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2015); McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006).2

As to the motion for new trial, Woodruff asserts that one of the jurors, during a post-trial interview, indicated that he did not believe the State had proven the charge of lewd or lascivious molestation for which Woodruff was found guilty. The juror said he came to this realization during *1267the reading of the jury’s verdict in open court. The juror acknowledged, however, that he and the other jurors had reached a unanimous verdict of “guilty” during the jury’s deliberations. The juror further acknowledged that, after the verdict was read in open court, he was polled by the trial court and agreed that the verdict of guilty was his verdict. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.4403 and 3.450.4

The trial court properly denied the motion for new trial. Woodruff does not assert that the jury’s deliberations were improperly influenced by external sources or that jurors decided the verdict by lot5 or otherwise expressly agreed to disregard their obligations and oaths. As the Florida Supreme Court held in Marks v. State Road Dep’t, 69 So.2d 771, 774-75 (Fla. 1954):

[Ajffidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the Court; the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow-jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other matter resting alone in the juror’s breast.

A review of the record in the instant case plainly establishes that this claim involves matters that essentially inhere in the verdict itself, and cannot serve as a basis for attacking its validity. Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1998); Mitchell v. State, 527 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1988). See also § 90.607(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing that “[ujpon inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror is not competent to testify as to any matter which essentially inheres in the verdict or indictment”).

*1268Finally, we decline to address the merits of Woodruffs claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without prejudice to Woodruff seeking such relief by appropriate postconviction motion. As a general rule, and subject only to the rare exception,6 such a claim may not be raised for the first time on direct appeal. Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla. 2001).

Affirmed.