JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER KNIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
KATIE LORRAINE KNIGHT, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2017-01-31
No. CASE NO. 1D16-2382
B.L. THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
208 So. 3d 1278 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2017) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Father Joseph Knight appealed a trial court order increasing his child support obligation after he failed to exercise his time-sharing responsibilities with the minor child. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the increase and remanded because the trial court improperly calculated the new amount using the gross-up method without meeting statutory requirements, though the court affirmed the trial court's authority to make the modification retroactive.


Holding

The trial court improperly used the gross-up method because the child spent less than the required 20 percent of overnights with the father, making the method inapplicable. Any deviation from guideline amounts exceeding five percent requires written justification, which was absent here. However, the trial court properly had authority to make the modification retroactive to the date the father first failed to exercise the time-sharing schedule.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may not apply the gross-up method for calculating child support when the parenting plan does not provide for each child to spend a substantial amount of tim…

[2] A deviation of more than five percent from the child support guideline amount requires a written finding explaining why the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropri…

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Key Quotes

“Because "substantial amount of time" translates to "at least 20 percent of the overnights of the year," and because the child spends less than twenty percent of his nights with the father, the trial court should not have used the gross-up method.”

Establishes that the gross-up method was inapplicable because the statutory threshold was not met

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Facts & Procedural History

Joseph and Katie Knight divorced in 2014 with an initial equal time-sharing arrangement requiring the father to pay approximately $200 per month in ch…

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Opinion of the Court
WINSOR, J.

WINSOR, J.

This is an appeal about child support. Joseph and Katie Knight — referred to here as the father and mother — divorced in 2014. For some time after that, they had equal time-sharing of their minor son, and the father was obligated to pay child support of approximately $200 per month. Later, after the father failed to exercise his timesharing responsibilities — essentially yielding full custody to the mother — the mother sought and obtained an order increasing the father’s monthly child-support obligation. The father now appeals that order, arguing that the trial court improperly calculated the new amount and wrongly applied the new figure retroactively.

I.

First, the father argues that the trial court was wrong to use the so-called “gross-up method” found in section *127961.30(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). That provision, which adjusts the guideline amount, applies only if a parenting plan, court-ordered time-sharing schedule, or agreed time-sharing arrangement “provides that each child spend a substantial amount of time with each parent.” Id. Because “substantial amount of time” translates to “at least 20 percent of the overnights of the year,” id. at (ll)(b)(8), and because the child spends less than twenty percent of his nights with the father, the trial court should not have used the gross-up method.

The mother defends the trial court’s decision by arguing that the trial court has discretion to deviate from the guidelines, irrespective of section 61.30(ll)(b). That is true as a general matter, but any deviation beyond five percent of the guideline amount requires a written finding “explaining why ordering payment of [the] guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.” § 61.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 668 So.2d 245, 246-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). There was no such finding here, and the deviation exceeded five percent. We therefore reverse. On remand, the trial court must either establish an amount within five percent of the guideline amount or make an appropriate finding justifying an alternate award.

II.

The father also argues that the trial court was wrong to make its child-support order retroactive. Although the amount of the retroactive award was improperly calculated, the trial court was correct to award relief retroactively. Section 61.30(ll)(c), which authorizes a modification based on a parent’s failure to regularly exercise time-sharing, also provides that “[a] modification pursuant to this paragraph is retroactive to the date the noncustodial parent first failed to regularly exercise the court-ordered or agreed time-sharing schedule.” On remand, the trial court should retroactively apply the new amount.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

B.L. THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Hardwick v. Smith (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
    …“relating to, providing, or being protective care or services for basic needs”). In this case, Appellant became the custodial parent when the child moved in with him and Appellee stopped exercising the court- ordered timesharing. Knight v. Knight, 208 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), is instructive on this point. In Knight, the parties originally had equal time-sharing of a minor child and neither was noncustodial under the terms of the court order. But later, “the father failed to exercise his timesharing r…

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