MARY M. COLE, DOING BUSINESS AS OLLIE TROUT TRAILER PARK, AND SIDNEY OLSEN, APPELLANTS,
v.
ELMER M. CARMELL, APPELLEE
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A trailer park operator negligently released a mobile home to an impostor, resulting in theft of its contents. The court held that Florida's statutory liability cap for lodging establishments does not apply to a trailer court operator's negligent release of the trailer itself, only to goods deposited for safekeeping whose value is uncertain.
The statutory liability cap does not apply to a trailer court operator's negligent act in releasing control of a trailer whose value is self-evident. The statute applies only to goods deposited for safekeeping where value cannot be ascertained without disclosure from the tenant.
“If such disclosures were not required, the hotel, motel, boarding house, apartment, etc., managements would have no way to ascertain the value of goods deposited with them that were subsequently lost or stolen.”
Establishes the statute's purpose: protecting lodging operators where the value of deposited goods cannot be ascertained without tenant disclosure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Carmell owned a house trailer located at Ollie Trout Trailer Park and instructed manager Sidney Olsen to release it to his brother Donald upo…
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The appellee owned a house trailer which was.located on space in the Ollie Trout Trailer Park. Before departing the Miami *279area, appellee gave instructions to Sidney ■Olsen, manager of the trailer park, to release the trailer to his brother, Donald, who was due to arrive from the north within the next few days. Approximately a week later, one Louis Levensque appeared at the trailer park, falsely representing himself to he Donald Carmell, and obtained possession of the trailer from Olsen. Levensque was subsequently apprehended and convicted, of the theft. The trailer was returned to appellee, though damaged to some extent.
This suit was brought against the trailer park and Olsen to recover damages for the personal items removed from the trailer, damages to the trailer and transportation costs occasioned by Olsen’s negligently releasing the trailer to the thief. Upon a jury trial, the court refused to instruct the jury, at the request of the appellant, to the effect that damages, if found, should be limited to $100, pursuant to § 509.111(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.1 Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict for the appellee in the amount of $700. Judgment was entered on the verdict and the defendants appealed.
The sole issue presented is the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury pursuant to § 509.111(2) supra. It immediately becomes apparent that house trailers were not under consideration by the legislature when the act was originally passed in 1874 (§ 4, Ch. 1999). It was not until 1947 that motor courts and trailer courts were included along with hotels, apartment houses, rooming houses and boarding houses. However, we feel the intent of the statute was to limit the liability of hotels, etc., for goods deposited for safekeeping when their value could not be ascertained without some disclosure from the tenant. See Lazare Kaplan & Sons Inc. v. Pensacola Hotel Company, D.C., 153 F.Supp. 31, affirmed 5 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 410. If such disclosures were not required, the hotel, motel, boarding house, apartment, etc., managements would have no way to ascertain the value of goods deposited with them that were subsequently lost or stolen.
Conversely, we do not feel the legislature intended to limit the liability of a trailer court operator for his negligent act in releasing to another control over a trailer located on the premises, the value of which is self-evident. In such cases, the trailer owner pays for the space on which the trailer or lodging facility rests, but not for the actual facilities afforded by the-trailer itself. In such circumstances the trailer court operator would have no control over the interior of a trailer such as would the manager of a hotel, motel or boarding house over the interior of their lodging facilities. The facts presented we conclude rendered inapplicable the limited liability provisions of the statute.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and PEARSON, J., concur.
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Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Fair, 575 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…jury to his guest’s property, should be strictly construed. Annot., Statutory Limitations Upon Innkeeper’s Liability As Applicable Where Guest’s Property Is Lost or Damaged Through Innkeeper’s Negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 1276 (1971). In Cole v. Carmell, 112 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), the court had occasion to construe a predecessor to the present section 509.111, which included trailer courts within its parameters, and to decide whether the statute applied to the theft of a house trailer from a trailer park.…
Authorities Cited
- Lazare Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. Pensacola Hotel Co., 253 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1958)