KELVIN FRAZIER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2017-01-20
No. Case No. 2D15-5244
CASANUEVA, CRENSHAW, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
209 So. 3d 635 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2017)

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Synopsis

Kelvin Frazier, sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole for first-degree murder committed as a juvenile in 1985, appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2). The court reverses, holding that juveniles sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are entitled to resentencing under Miller v. Alabama as applied by recent Florida Supreme Court precedent.


Holding

Juveniles convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole are entitled to resentencing in conformance with Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Atwell v. State established that Florida's existing parole system does not provide the individualized consideration of juvenile status required by Miller, and such sentences are therefore unconstitutional.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to vacate a sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2) may be based on newly established constitutional rights that have been held to apply re…

[2] Sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of murder are unconstitutional if they do not provide for individualized considerati…

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Key Quotes

“that Florida's existing parole system, as set forth by statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of Atwell's juvenile status at the time of the murder, as required by Miller, and that his sentence, which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional.”

The Florida Supreme Court's Atwell decision establishing the constitutional violation requiring resentencing for juveniles sentenced to life with possibility of parole.

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Facts & Procedural History

Frazier was convicted of first-degree murder committed in 1985 when he was a juvenile and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parol…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Kelvin Frazier appeals the order summarily denying his motion seeking to vacate his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2) (providing an exception to the two-year time limit for newly established constitutional rights that have been held to apply retroactively). We reverse.

In his motion, Frazier alleged that he was entitled to relief under the Florida Supreme Court’s recent cases interpreting *636Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), because the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder committed in 1985 when he was a juvenile. See Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393 (Fla. 2015). But those cases did not address the issue of whether juveniles convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole were entitled to resen-tencing under Miller. Because then-existing case law held that such juveniles were not entitled to relief, the postconviction court denied Frazier’s motion. See, e.g., McPherson v. State, 138 So.3d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), quashed, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Oct. 28, 2016). However, the supreme court recently addressed the issue raised by Frazier when it quashed Atwell v. State, 128 So.3d 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). In Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2016), the court concluded “that Florida’s existing parole system, as set forth by statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of Atwell’s juvenile status at the time of the murder, as required by Miller, and that his sentence, which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional.” The court held that juveniles sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are entitled to resentencing in conformance with chapter 14-220, Laws of Florida. Id. at 1050 (citing Horsley, 160 So.3d at 399); see also Landy v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2555 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 16, 2016) (reversing Landy’s life sentence for murder pursuant to Atwell and remanding for resentencing under chapter 14-220).

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Frazier’s postconviction motion and remand for resentencing in conformance with chapter 14-220, Laws of Florida, as codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014).

Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA, CRENSHAW, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.


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